# Lopez v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · May 3, 2000 · 18 S.W.3d 220 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627286 ## Case - **Full name:** Rudolfo LOPEZ, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** May 3, 2000 - **Citations:** 18 S.W.3d 220; 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 49; 2000 WL 526242 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Mansfield - **Judges:** Keasler, McCormick, Meyers, Price, Holland, Womack, Mansfield, Keller, Johnson - **Cited by:** 326 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627286 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the fact that the Department of Human Resources “closed” the case and “ruled out” abuse does not necessarily demonstrate that the allegations of abuse were false; “[t]his could simply indicate a lack of evidence to prove the allegation at that time, or an administ… - explaining that the trial court maintains broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination and that “[i]n weighing whether evidence must be admitted under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court should balance the probative value of the evidence sought to be… - holding that fact that case involving prior accusation was “closed” was not probative of falsehood of allegation, as “[t]his could simply indicate a lack of evidence to prove the allegation at that time, or an administrative decision that, despite the allegation’s validity, th… - concluding Confrontation Clause did not trump Rule 608 and require admission of evidence that complainant previously falsely accused his mother of physical abuse, in part because physical abuse had “almost nothing in common” with complainant’s allegation of sexual abuse agains… - holding that evidentiary rule barring cross-examination of a witness about specific conduct for the purpose of attacking the witness’s credibility excludes cross-examination about prior false accusations unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risks of juror c… ## Opinion text MANSFIELD, J., delivered the concurring opinion. While I wholeheartedly agree with much of the well-written opinion of the majority and agree with the result it achieves, I cannot agree that a defendant accused of committing a sexual offense may not introduce evidence of prior accusations made by the complainant alleging commission of sexual offense(s) subsequently determined to be false. The area of sex offenses is unique, having many aspects not found in connection with other offenses. First, in many cases, there is often little physical evidence and it often comes down to the word of the accuser versus that of the defendant. Often, the accuser is a young child whose memory may be limited or whose version of what may have actually occurred has been influenced by others with an agenda. 1 In some instances, the accuser and the defendant know each other, and the accusation is motivated by financial considerations (i.e., blackmail), later regret over what was a “voluntary” sexual encounter involving alcohol or drug consumption, or retaliation for being “dumped.” Merely being publicly accused of a sex offense is devastating and results nearly always in the destruction of the reputation of the person (nearly always a male) so accused, even if subsequently found innocent. After all, the accused, but rarely the complainant, is the one whose name appears in print. Given the above, fundamental fairness and due process require that the defendant charged with a sex offense be entitled, on cross-examination, to impeach the complainant with evidence that he/she has falsely accused others of having committed sex offenses against him/her. I would require the defendant, at the time the complainant is about to commence testifying, to inform the court, outside the presence of the jury, that he/she intends to introduce evidence of prior false accusations of sex offenses made by the complainant. The court would then be required to conduct a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to evaluate said evidence and to de *227 termine if it is admissible. 2 Its ruling would be subject on appeal to an abuse of discretion standard. With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court. KELLER, J., delivered a concurring opinion. The Court today declines to adopt an across-the-board exception to Rule 608(b) for sexual offenses. I agree that a case-by-case approach is appropriate for determining when admission of evidence of pri- or false allegations is required by the Confrontation Clause. I think, though, that as a practical matter, evidence of prior false allegations will be admissible more often in sex cases than in most other types of offenses. The Court seems to suggest otherwise, and it is from this suggestion that I wish to distance myself. The Court says that credibility of the witnesses is no more important in sex offenses than in any other case. Maybe so, but credibility is more likely to be the only factor in sex cases than it is in other types of cases. For most other kinds of offenses, one can expect corroborating evidence — missing property in a theft case, injury in an assault case, a body in a murder case. One can imagine scenarios in non-sex cases in which credibility of the witness is the only question for the jury, but they are exceptions to the norm. Usually there will be physical evidence of some kind which the jury may consider. And consent is rarely raised in non-sex cases. When a defendant claims consent, physical evidence that sexual relations took place becomes moot; credibility of the parties becomes the whole question for the jury. I think that it is in sex cases that juries will most often be asked to reach a verdict solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, and therefore I think that it is in sex cases that the balancing approach will most often render such evidence admissible. I join the opinion of the Court. Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion. I concur only in the judgment of the court. Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. At trial, appellant attempted to impeach P.M., the complainant, with a report from the Texas Department of Protective And Regulatory Services (TDPRS) concerning an allegedly false accusation of physical abuse that the complainant had earlier made against his mother. The trial court excluded the evidence. The Court of Appeals found that Tex.R.CRIm. Evid. 608(b) (now Tex.R. Evid. 608(b)) prohibited this evidence from coming in, and that the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 608(b) violated appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Lopez v. State, 989 S.W.2d 402, 408 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999). It reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. We granted the state’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence violated appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. It appears from the record that the trial judge in the instant case did not base his decision on Rule 608(b). Instead, he stated that he was excluding the evidence because it was not “relevant to ... any of the matters that [were] on trial.... ” Tex R.Crim. Evid. 403. In fact, there is little evidence that this prior accusation was false. Although the case worker from TDPRS seemed skeptical of the accusation, it is not clear why she recommended that the case be closed. According to the Court of Appeals, The case worker described P.M. as “very provocative and hard to handle,” and had “the run of the house.” She found that P.M. was unable to tell her what a “steel washer” was or where it *228 was in his home, that P.M. did not have any injuries, and the incident was “ruled out.” The report indicated that P.M. had trouble making and keeping friends because he refused to bathe and because he lied to them. He “is constantly making up stories.” The case worker recommended that the case be closed. Lopez, 989 S.W.2d at 404 . 1 The Court also noted that the recommendation that the case be closed was “based in part on the case worker’s conclusion that there was no corroborative evidence of physical abuse and also because P.M.’s mother was very cooperative in seeking counseling to help her deal with P.M.’s behavior.” Id. at 404 n. 2. This evidence had little of probative value going to the falsity of the accusation; this is apparently why the trial judge excluded it. On this basis, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. Furthermore, such exclusion did not violate appellant’s right of confrontation. As has been noted, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. Such limits have been held not to conflict with the Confrontation Clause, which “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)) (emphasis in original); see also Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Therefore, I believe that the court of appeals erred in holding that appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause had been violated. However, the majority appears to have accepted that there is a conflict between Rule 608(b) and the Confrontation Clause. In this regard, it states that “[w]e have previously indicated that the Confrontation Clause will prevail if there is a conflict between it and the rules of evidence,” and that “Rule 101(c) of the Rules of Evidence dictates that the Constitution should control if there is a conflict.” Ante, at 222. These statements indicate a misunderstanding of the law. Even without our previous statement or Tex.R. Evid. 101(c), any conflict between our rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause would still require, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that the latter prevail over the former. See U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). The issue, of course, is whether there is such a conflict. As noted above, I do not believe that there is such a conflict. Based on the foregoing, I concur only in the judgment of the Court. . I note particularly the false charges of child sexual abuse that have resulted from "junk science” such as repressed memory syndrome and in divorce cases where such charges are used occasionally as a form of extortion to gain a favorable outcome with respect to custody and/or property division. I also acknowledge, however, that many bona fide cases involving sex crimes are not reported, for various reasons. . I agree with the opinion of the majority that evidence of prior false accusations of sexual misconduct, to be admissible, must be "clear and convincing.” . The majority has, perhaps reasonably, assumed that "steel washer” means a washing machine. Ante, at 222, 226. However, the record offers nothing to support that assumption. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627286. Public record. Not legal advice.