# Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle

> Washington Supreme Court · May 14, 1992 · 119 Wash. 2d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9626652

## Case

- **Full name:** Sintra, Inc., Et Al, Appellants, v. the City of Seattle, Et Al, Respondents
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 14, 1992
- **Citations:** 119 Wash. 2d 1; 829 P.2d 765; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 135
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Utter
- **Judges:** Durham
- **Cited by:** 143 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9626652

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that enforcement of ordinance that required property owners who were converting low income housing to other uses to pay a substantial fee was unduly oppressive
- concluding that a “body of cogent, workable rules upon which regulators and landowners alike can rely” is essential to resolving land use regulation disputes
- holding that a land use decision being challenged under § 1983 denies substantive due process only if it is “invidious or irrational”
- holding that imposition of a $218,000 fee to develop a $670,000 property was unduly oppressive

## Opinion text

*30 Utter, J.
(concurring) — Although I agree with the majority opinion, I write separately to develop more fully the application of the law of exhaustion, finality and ripeness to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 takings claim and inverse condemnation claim in this case. Clarity and correct use of terminology is important in this complex area of the law. More is at stake than "mere jurisprudential fastidiousness." Wright, The Timing of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Overlapping Doctrines, 11 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 83 (1987).
I
Exhaustion, Finality, and Ripeness
One commentator succinctly described the rationale behind the procedural requirements that must be satisfied before a takings claim can be considered:
The procedural hurdles that landowners and other regulated interests must clear to raise just compensation claims are a result of the unique nature of the clause. Under the just compensation clause, governments are not prohibited from taking private property; rather they are required to provide compensation when their actions constitute a taking. Thus, the Court treats as relevant whether there are administrative and judicial mechanisms through which landowners and other regulated interests may obtain approval for their desired use of their property or, failing that, receive proper compensation.
(Footnote omitted.) 1 S. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts § 3.4(d)(1), at 3-35 (1989). In doctrinal terms, those procedural hurdles are ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and finality.
The doctrines of ripeness and exhaustion both deal with the timing of judicial review, and have similar purposes:
Both doctrines serve agency autonomy and judicial economy by allowing most administrative proceedings to conclude prior to judicial intervention and, by deferring intervention in this manner, courts allow agencies to perform their functions and assist their own later review of the agency's action.
Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 547 , *31 612. In the past we have recognized that exhaustion and ripeness are related concepts. Estate of Friedman v. Pierce Cy., 112 Wn.2d 68, 76 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989). When we considered an inverse condemnation action in Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cy., 114 Wn.2d 320, 339 , 787 P.2d 907 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990), we used the terms exhaustion and ripeness almost interchangeably. A third doctrine, finality, is related to ripeness and exhaustion: "Problems of finality are in the area where the law of exhaustion joins or overlaps with the law of ripeness." 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26:10, at 458 (2d ed. 1983). Finality is not so much a separate requirement as an element common to both exhaustion and ripeness. Power, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 618.
II
The Section 1983 Claim
Although absolute doctrinal clarity may not be necessary in all cases, it is important in a § 1983 claim that we carefully distinguish between these doctrines. In Williamson Cy. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 , 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 , 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), the United States Supreme Court grappled with these legal concepts in a case involving a § 1983 takings claim. The Court declined to reach the takings issue because the case was not yet ripe. The Court stated two reasons for the absence of ripeness:
Because respondent has not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, respondent’s claim is not ripe.
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186 . Thus, for a § 1983 case to be ripe, a plaintiff must seek a final administrative decision as well as pursue state procedures to obtain just compensation.
The Court, however, differentiated ripeness and finality from exhaustion of administrative remedies. The plaintiff claimed that it was not required to seek variances from regulations because its suit was based on § 1983, and there *32 is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies in such a suit. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 192 (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 , 73 L. Ed. 2d 172 , 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982)). The Court, however, differentiated finality and exhaustion:
While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 193 . 17 The Court found that there was not a final agency decision because the plaintiff had not sought variances from the Commission. It stated, however, that finality would not have required appeals, for example, to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 193 .
Thus, when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 takings action, we should employ the 2-part test used in Williamson to determine whether the action is ripe: (1) Has there been final agency action on the application of the regulation? and (2) Has the plaintiff utilized state procedures for obtaining compensation? The majority correctly concludes that Sintra has not utilized state procedures for obtaining compensation. On that basis alone, this case is not ripe for purposes of § 1983. Therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether there was final agency action to resolve the § 1983 ripeness issue.
*33 III
The Inverse Condemnation Claim
There remains, however, Sintra's inverse condemnation claim. Unlike the § 1983 claim, it is appropriate for us to use the term "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in considering that claim. Moreover, we should not construe this term narrowly to mean only whether Sintra has pursued its administrative appeals, as the Court in Williamson did in the § 1983 context. Instead, the exhaustion inquiry should be "how far a party must pursue an administrative remedy before going to court". 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25:1, at 350 (2d ed. 1983). The two reasons for the exhaustion doctrine we listed in Estate of Friedman v. Pierce Cy., 112 Wn.2d 68, 77-79 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989) should be assessed in determining whether Sintra has exhausted its administrative remedies. First, we noted the policies favoring the doctrine of exhaustion. Those policies are to
(1) insure against premature interruption of the administrative process, (2) allow the agency to develop the necessary factual background on which to base a decision, (3) allow the exercise of agency expertise [in its area], (4) provide a more efficient process and allow the agency to correct its own mistake, and (5) insure that individuals are not encouraged to ignore [its] procedures by resort[ing] to the courts.
Estate of Friedman, 112 Wn.2d at 78 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 456-57 , 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) (citing South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King Cy., 101 Wn.2d 68, 73-74 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984))). The second reason, which is "at least as important" is that it is difficult to assess a takings claim when administrative remedies have not been exhausted. Estate of Friedman, 112 Wn.2d at 78 . Issues central to the takings inquiry, such as the economic impact of the regulation, or its affect on investment backed expectations, may be impossible to assess if a plaintiff has not sought administrative relief and there is no final agency action. The trial court should consider the reasons we listed *34 in Estate of Friedman for the exhaustion doctrine when it considers the exhaustion issue.
Johnson, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied June 17, 1992.
The Court's categorical distinction between exhaustion and finality in Williamson is, however, questionable. The Court in Williamson unduly restricted the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine by limiting its exhaustion of administrative appeals. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 547 , 613 n.294. A better approach is to recognize, as Professor Davis does, that finality is an aspect of both ripeness and exhaustion, and that issues of finality arise at the intersection of these two doctrines. 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25:1, at 350, § 26:10, at 458 (2d ed. 1983).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9626652. Public record. Not legal advice.