# Lundberg v. County of Alameda

> California Supreme Court · June 6, 1956 · 46 Cal. 2d 644

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9625284

## Case

- **Full name:** ALFRED J. LUNDBERG, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA Et Al., Defendants and Appellants; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC WELFARE CORPORATION OF SAN FRANCISCO (A Corporation), Intervener and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 6, 1956
- **Citations:** 46 Cal. 2d 644; 298 P.2d 1; 1956 Cal. LEXIS 219
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Schauer
- **Judges:** Gibson, Schauer
- **Cited by:** 76 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9625284

## Opinion text

SCHAUER, J.,
Dissenting.—Since 1914 the provisions of section la of article XIII of the California Constitution have exempted from taxation the property of a nonprofit “educational institution of collegiate grade, . . . used exclusively for the purposes of education.” (Italics added.) The quoted language is specific; it leaves no room for speculation or “construction.” The majority opinion holds that the language in section lc of the same article of the Constitution, adopted in 1944, which authorizes the Legislature to exempt from taxation property “used exclusively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and owned by” (italics added) certain institutions, likewise authorizes the exemption of all the property of such institutions which is used for educational purposes of any character or grade—more specifically, property used for schools of less than collegiate grade. This holding is reached despite the fact that the word “educational” is notably absent from the 1944 amendment.
*656 To so construe section lc of article XIII as to encompass educational purposes, in addition to the “religious, hospital or charitable purposes” which are expressly designated in the section, does violence to the plain meaning of the language used, to the intent of the voters who adopted the section, and to settled principles of statutory construction.
First, the Constitution itself is specific in its property tax exemption provisions. Thus, section 1 of article XIII designates as “exempt from taxation . . . property used for free public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools.” Section la of article XIII declares that “Any educational institution of collegiate grade . . . not conducted for profit, shall hold exempt from taxation its buildings and equipment, its grounds . . ., its securities and income used exclusively for the purposes of education.” Other specific exemptions are listed in article IX. Section 10 of that article declares that “All property now or hereafter held in trust for the founding, maintenance or benefit of the Leland Stanford Junior University . . . may be exempted by special act from State taxation . . . and all other real property so held and used by the university for educational purposes exclusively, may be similarly exempted from county and municipal taxation. ...” Section 11 provides that “All property now or hereafter belonging to ‘The California School of Mechanical Arts,’ . . . shall be exempt from taxation.” Section 12 makes the same provision as to “All property now or hereafter belonging to the ‘California Academy of Sciences. ’ ’ ’ Section 13 declares that ‘ ‘All property now or hereafter belonging to the Cogswell Poly-technical College . . . shall be exempt from taxation.” Section 15 specifies that “All property as of July 1, 1929, held in trust for the founding, maintenance or benefit of the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery and the increments thereof and all personal property received in exchange therefor shall be exempt from taxation.” In view of these unusually express and specific designations in the Constitution of the property to which the people are willing to grant tax exemption, it appears to me too clear for serious debate among jurists following the law that if by the provisions of section lc of article XIII it was intended to grant exemption to property devoted to educational purposes, then the language used would have said so, clearly and precisely.
Second, the fact that as originally submitted to the Legislature section lc referred to property used for “religious, *657 educational, hospital or charitable purposes” (italics added), but that before being submitted to the people for a vote the classification of “educational” was deleted from the measure, is a further indication of the intent that property devoted to such purposes not be included in the authorization for exemption. This view is likewise borne out by the presentation of the measure made in the official voters’ pamphlet, wherein the argument in favor of adopting section lc refers to the amendment as “Fair Play for Charities” and declares, among other things, that “To be exempted, property must be owned and used exclusively for the purposes stated. The amendment does not authorize exemption of investment property or large landholdings. Churches and colleges already are exempt. Competent legal authority advises that schools other than colleges will not be exempted under this amendment because the Legislature expressly eliminated the term ‘educational.’ ” (Italics added.) At no point in the arguments concerning the measure, either pro or con, are the above declarations disputed. It thus appears clear that the voters approved the measure in the belief that property used for educational purposes was not included in the authorized exemptions.
Moreover, the fate of other attempted amendments of the Constitution so as to specifically authorize the exemption of property used for private schools of less than collegiate grade expresses more pointedly than can mere words the affirmative intent of the voters of this state that such property continue on the tax rolls. In 1926 a proposed amendment to section la of article XIII, submitted as proposition Number 11 on the ballot, to extend the exemption to property used for educational purposes by “any educational institution of secondary grade” was defeated by the vote of the people. Within seven years the issue was again presented, as proposition Number 4 on the 1933 ballot, and again the people refused to amend section la so as to extend exemption to the property of “Any private educational institution of less than collegiate grade.” It is my firm conviction that this court should not, in the guise of statutory construction, effect an amendment of the Constitution which the voting citizens of California have repeatedly rejected.
Finally, the people of this state, for the purpose of securing the “equality of taxation which results from subjecting all property to the same burden” (Watchtower Bible & Tract *658 Soc. v. County of Los Angeles (1947), 30 Cal.2d 426, 429 [ 182 P.2d 178 ]), have provided in section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution that “All property in the State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided.” To carry out the objective of equality in taxation, ‘ ‘ Constitutional provisions and statutes granting exemption from taxation are strictly construed to the end that such concession will be neither enlarged nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the language employed. [Citations.]” (Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles (1950), 35 Cal.2d 729, 734 [ 221 P.2d 31 , 15 A.L.R. 2d 1045 ]; see also Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles (1953), 41 Cal.2d 844, 849 [ 264 P.2d 539 ]; Sutter Hospital v. City of Sacramento (1952), 39 Cal.2d 33, 39 [ 244 P.2d 390 ]; Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. County of Los Angeles (1947), supra, 30 Cal.2d 426, 428 .) “The provisions of . . . [California’s] Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.” (Const., art. I, § 22.) The justices of this court, regardless of personal views on social, political, economic or religious subjects, are in duty bound to support the Constitution and laws of this state. “The powers of the government of . . . California shall be divided into three separate departments—the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted.” (Const., art. Ill, § 1.) Obedient to my concept of judicial duty I must apply the firmly established principles of construction above delineated, give effect to the plain intent and specific language of the framers of section lc of article XIII of the Constitution, respect the principle of division of powers of government above quoted, and hold unauthorized the purported exemption of property, however laudatory the objectives, which is sought to be sustained on the sole basis that the property is “used exclusively for school purposes of less than collegiate grade”-—a use which is not of a character specified in the constitutional authorization, and which is therefore beyond the power of either the Legislature or this court to write into the Constitution.
*659 The judgment of the superior court, following the law, should be affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 5, 1956. Shenk, J., Carter J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9625284. Public record. Not legal advice.