# Hassell v. Onslow County Board of Education > Supreme Court of North Carolina · June 12, 2008 · 362 N.C. 299 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624512 ## Case - **Full name:** BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** June 12, 2008 - **Citations:** 362 N.C. 299; 661 S.E.2d 709; 2008 N.C. LEXIS 498 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Timmons-Goodson - **Judges:** Hudson, Timmons-Goodson - **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624512 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that “[t]he Commission may not wholly disregard competent evidence; however, as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given to witness testimony, the Commission may believe all or a part or none of any witness’s testimony,” and “[t]he Commission is… - stating that “[t]he Commission ‘may not wholly disregard competent evidence’; however, as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given to witness testimony, the Commission ‘may believe all or a part or none of any witness’s testimony,’ ” and “[t]he Commissi… - holding that the Commission properly considered the expert witness’s testimony regarding the plaintiff’s alleged occupational disease and afforded it little weight because the expert could not speak to the validity of the plaintiff’s complaints about the school work, and the e… - noting "Commission is not required to accept the testimony of a witness, even if the testimony is uncontradicted ." (citation omitted) (emphasis added) ## Opinion text Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON, dissenting. Because I believe that the majority has erroneously upheld the denial of workers’ compensation benefits on the basis of fault or contributory negligence, I respectfully dissent. While the majority disavows any language from the Commission premising compensability on the absence of fault, it fails to address whether the Commission and Court of Appeals majority relied on this erroneous premise. In acknowledging an error in the proceedings below, yet upholding the result, it appears that the majority’s treatment of plaintiff’s argument omits a piece of the puzzle. *309 The majority acknowledges that any language in Finding Thirteen implying that fault plays a role in determining compensability is “irrelevant and inappropriate.” However, the majority fails to evaluate the impact of the application of this erroneous standard. In the wider scheme of our Workers’ Compensation Act as well as in the context of this case, the omitted piece is neither inconsequential nor tangential. We have previously observed that one of the purposes of our Workers’ Compensation Act was to abolish the “unholy trinity” of employer defenses which generally precluded any recovery by the injured worker at common law: contributory negligence; assumption of risk; and the fellow-servant rule. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 711 , 325 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1985) (citation omitted). “ ‘Contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employee.’ ” Hamilton v. S. Ry. Co., 200 N.C. 543, 561 , 158 S.E. 75, 85 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 636 (1931). In this case, the critical finding that plaintiff argues, but which the majority largely sidesteps in its analysis, is Finding of Fact 13: 13. Although plaintiff developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher. Plaintiff was in a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Considering all the evidence presented, the Commission finds that there was nothing unusual about plaintiff’s job with defendant or what was expected of her as compared to any person similarly situated. The work plaintiff was asked to perform by defendant was the same kind of work any teacher is required to do. Plaintiff was merely asked to perform her job in the manner it should have been performed. Plaintiff was responsible for the bad environment in her classroom. (emphasis added). The above language reflects almost a textbook definition of contributory negligence, a defense that the Commission may not consider under our Workers’ Compensation Act. The Conclusions of Law similarly reflect language that imputes fault to plaintiff and denies recovery on that basis: 2. Mental illness which results from failing to perform one’s job duties ... is not compensable .... *310 3. In the present case, plaintiff’s stress and anxiety disorder developed from her inability to perform her job in accordance with defendant’s requirements. Denying compensation on the basis of plaintiff’s own fault is contrary to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Hartley v. N.C. Prison Dep’t, 258 N.C. 287, 290 , 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962) (“[T]he various compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery.” (citations omitted)). The only exceptions to this rule concern intoxication or intentional injuries. Id. Despite the explicit declarations of the majority, I fear that today’s decision will open the door for future denials of workers’ compensation benefits on the basis of the injured employee’s own less than exemplary workmanship.’ Furthermore, such a spectacle will inevitably draw this Court into a morass of endless litigation seeking to separate innocent from blameworthy injuries. This is exactly the situation the Workers’ Compensation Act sought to avert by excluding common law defenses. Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 556, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2003) (“[T]he North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act was created to ensure that injured employees receive sure and certain recovery for their work-related injuries without having to prove negligence on the part of the employer or defend against charges of contributory negligence.” (citing Pleasant , 312 NC. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 246-47 )) Since I fear that today’s ruling departs from that, I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624512. Public record. Not legal advice.