# Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County

> Washington Supreme Court · March 29, 1979 · 91 Wash. 2d 721

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624230

## Case

- **Full name:** Weyerhaeuser Company, Respondent, v. King County, Appellant
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** March 29, 1979
- **Citations:** 91 Wash. 2d 721; 592 P.2d 1108; 1979 Wash. LEXIS 1185
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Dolliver
- **Judges:** Dolliver, Horowitz
- **Cited by:** 34 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624230

## Opinion text

*737 Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — Except to those persons familiar with the legislation being considered, the journals of the House and Senate rarely reveal the political struggle or the balancing of interests which accompanies the enactment of most major legislation. A review of the pages of the House and Senate Journals for 1974 and 1975, however, indicates clearly the scope, intensity, and public nature of the contest attendant to the passage of the Forest Practices Act of 1974 (FPA), Laws of 1974, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, p. 401, and the 1975 amendment, Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, p. 665. A number of policy questions were to be determined by that branch of government to which the constitution gives basic policy-making powers, the legislature. Involved were timber interests, both large and small, environmentalists, the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Ecology, local governments, individual legislators, and numerous other interested citizens. As is the case with most controversial legislation, some parties did not get what they wanted. In the instance of the 1975 amendments to the FPA, King County lost its power to regulate forest practices within the "shorelines". Having lost the political struggle in the legislature, the county now attempts to win the legal battle by claiming the 1975 amendment violates Const, art. 2, § 37.
Const, art. 2, § 37 states:
No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length.
In an early and comprehensive analysis of this provision, the court said:
The purpose of the constitutional provision was to protect the members of the legislature and the public against fraud and deception; not to trammel or hamper the legislature in the enactment of laws. ... So long as a legislative act is complete in itself, and has a sufficient title, it satisfies the requirements of the constitution, whether it contains much or little. The legislature may embody all legislation relating to a given subject in a single act, or it may cover the subject by a succession of acts. This is *738 entirely a matter of legislative discretion over which we can assume no control.
Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 82 , 109 P. 316 (1910).
In Naccarato v. Sullivan, 46 Wn.2d 67, 75 , 278 P.2d 641 (1955), the court stated the instances where article 2, section 37, is not violated:
(1) complete acts which repeal prior acts or sections thereof on the same subject; (2) complete acts which adopt by reference provisions of prior acts; (3) complete acts which supplement prior acts or sections thereof without repealing them; (4) complete acts which incidentally or impliedly amend prior acts.
See also 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Amendatory Acts, ch. 22, at 104-208 (Sands 4th ed. 1972).
To see if Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, p. 665, meets any of the exemptions, it is first necessary to determine if it is a complete act. Initially, the majority errs by confining only to section 11 of that chapter its consideration as to whether article 2, section 37 is violated. Obviously a mere section of an act is not complete, but it is to chapter 200 in its entirety that we must apply the constitutional test. Chapter 200 is a complete act. I find it hard to believe that either the majority of King County could find otherwise. See Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 24 , 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
The majority goes on to assert that "The enactment in question here, however, cannot be understood without reference to both the FPA and the SMA [Shoreline Management Act of 1971, RCW 90.58]. It is therefore not a complete act and is not excepted from application of the constitutional requirement." This simply misconstrues the constitutional requirement and overlooks the consistent position of this court beginning with the leading case on the subject, Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, supra. In commenting on a case which had done exactly what the majority proposes, the court said:
*739 But how often must we look to two or more acts to ascertain the full declaration of the legislative will. No one will for a moment doubt the power of the legislature to exempt homesteads by one act, household goods by another, farming implements by a third, and so on; yet the full declaration of the legislative will on the subject of exemptions could only be gathered by referring to these several acts. Followed to its logical conclusion, this argument would compel the legislature to embody in a single enactment, or in amendments thereto, all legislation relating to a single subject. Such was not the object or purpose of the provision in question. So long as a legislative act is complete in itself and does not tend to mislead or deceive, it is not violative of the constitution.
Spokane Grain & Fuel Co., at 84.
Not only is this a complete act in itself, but it meets the purpose of the amendment as declared by this court: to protect the legislature and the public from fraud and deception. Spokane Grain & Fuel Co., at 82.
No person of ordinary intelligence can mistake its meaning. We know full well what the legislature intended, without referring to any other act or statute.
(Italics mine.) Spokane Grain & Fuel Co., at 84. It should not go without notice that at no time has there been a claim of fraud or deception violative of article 2, section 37. In fact, article 2, section 37 was not cited in the briefs of the parties but was raised sua sponte by this court and was discussed only in supplemental briefs filed subsequent to oral argument.
If Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, p. 665, is a complete act, does it come under an exemption? It seems to me it clearly is both a complete act which incidentally or impliedly amends a prior act, and a complete act which repeals a section of an act on the same subject.
Prior to the 1975 amendments to the FPA, local governments under the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA) had certain powers to regulate forest practices in the shorelines of the state. See Laws of 1974, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, § 24(4), p. 420. After the passage of chapter 200 in 1975, certain of these regulative powers were removed from local *740 governments. Those sections of the SMA granting these powers to local governments to regulate forest practices within the shorelines of the state were repealed and the functions of local governments given to the forest practices board.
In addition to the general rules announced in Naccarato v. Sullivan, supra, we have specifically upheld legislation which substantially vests certain public officers with specified functions theretofore performed by other officers. Opportunity Township v. Kingsland, 194 Wash. 229, 244 , 77 P.2d 793 (1938). In Carstens v. DeSellem, 82 Wash. 643, 647 , 144 P. 934 (1914), referring to an article 2, section 37, challenge, we said, "It is true that the act imposes certain duties upon the commissioner which by other statutes are imposed upon other officers. But we do not think this fact renders the act obnoxious to the provision of the constitution under review." See also 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 22.21 (Sands 4th ed. 1972); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 564 , 569 (1930); Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 298 , 347 P.2d 1081 (1959); Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wn.2d 405, 412 , 243 P.2d 627 (1952); Bellingham v. Hite, 37 Wn.2d 652 , 225 P.2d 895 (1950).
What does section 11 of chapter 200 of the 1975 amendment do? The crucial language is in subsection (4) of section 11, and provides:
(4) Authority granted by chapter 90.58 RCW, the "Shoreline Management Act of 1971", except that in relation to "shorelines" as defined in RCW 90.58.030, the following shall apply:
(a) The forest practice regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter shall be the sole rules applicable to the performance of forest practices, and enforcement thereof shall be solely as provided in 76.09 RCW;
(b) As to that road construction which constitutes a substantial development, no permit shall be required under chapter 90.58 RCW for the construction of up to five hundred feet of one and only one road or segment of a road provided such road does not enter the shoreline more than once. Such exemption from said permit requirements shall be limited to a single road or road *741 segment for each forest practice and such road construction shall be subject to the requirements of chapter 76.09 ROW and regulations adopted pursuant thereto and to the prohibitions or restrictions of any master program in effect under the provisions of chapter 90.58 RCw. Noth-ing in this subsection shall add to or diminish the authority of the shoreline management act regarding road construction except as specifically provided herein! The provisions of this subsection shall not relate to any road which crosses over or through a stream, lake, or other water body subject to chapter 90.58 RCW;
(c) Nothing in shall create, add to, or diminish the authority of local government to prohibit or restrict forest practices within the shorelines through master programs adopted and approved pursuant to chapter 90.58 RCW except as provided in (a) and Q5J above. ~
Any powers granted by chapter 90.58 RCW pertaining to forest practices, as amended herein, are expressly limited to lands located within "shorelines of the state" as defined in RCW 90.58.030.
In understanding the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, and the impact of the Forest Practices Act of 1974, it is crucial to make the determination as to the various types of shorelines involved in management of the "shorelines of the state." RCW 90.58.030(2)(d) defines "shorelines" as all water areas including wetlands except shorelines of statewide significance, lakes below 20 acres and streams of limited mean annual flow. RCW 90.58.030(2)(e) lists the specific categories of "shorelines of state-wide significance". RCW 90.58.030(2)(c) defines "shorelines of the state" as the "total of all 'shorelines' and 'shorelines of state-wide significance' within the state".
Thus, after the effective date of the 1975 amendments, the forest practices regulations adopted for "shorelines" shall be promulgated by the forest practices board. RCW 76.09.040. The regulations of the forest practices board shall be the sole regulations for forest practices within the "shorelines". Furthermore, for certain kinds of road construction within the "shorelines" no permit from local government under the SMA shall be required. Laws of 1975, *742 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, § ll(4)(b), p. 676; WAC 222-50. As to "shorelines of state-wide significance", local government retains its same power under the SMA, including the power to issue permits. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, § ll(4)(c), p. 676. I find it hard to conceive of a more complete preemption of authority.
The only cases the majority uses to discuss the issue of preemption are Simpson Timber Co. v. Olympic Air Pollution Control Authority, 87 Wn.2d 35 , 549 P.2d 5 (1976); and Edmonds School Dist. 15 v. Mountlake Terrace, 77 Wn.2d 609 , 465 P.2d 177 (1970). Neither case, however, is concerned with the requirements of article 2, section 37, and neither is in point.
The majority cites State ex rel. Arnold v. Mitchell, 55 Wash. 513 , 104 P. 791 (1909), in support of its position. The facts in Mitchell , however, were radically different from those in the case before us. In Mitchell , a 1907 act of the legislature relating to the direct primary was significantly amended by a 1909 statute. However, the 1909 statute which purported to amend the direct primary law did not cite it and failed even to make a "suggestion of an amendment" to the primary law. Mitchell , at 516.
This is not the situation here. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, § 11(4), p. 676, specifically mentions RCW 90.58, the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, and RCW 90.58-.030, containing the definitions of "shorelines" and "shorelines of the state".
Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wn.2d 183 , 558 P.2d 769 (1977), also is claimed to support the majority view. Again, the facts are completely different and the case inapposite. In Flanders , the court struck down an attempt by the legislature to amend the codified public assistance laws by a proviso in the uncodified supplemental appropriations act. With no reference to the codified public assistance laws, which had no age limitation for the receipt of general assistance, the uncodified appropriations bill set 50 as the lower age limit for persons receiving public assistance. In *743 commenting on this action as it related to article 2, section 37, we said:
For 37 years, the statutory law of this state has provided for public assistance on the basis of need with no age restriction. The new restriction is clearly an amendment to RCW 74.04.005, adding to the restrictions already enumerated there. However, the statute will never reflect this change but will continue to read as it always has, with no age restriction. One seeking the law on the subject would have to know one must look under an "appropriations" title in the uncodified session laws to find the amendment. The fact that the budget bill is not codified strikes at the very heart and purpose of Const, art. 2, § 37.
Flanders , at 189.
The majority neglects to note that the language of the court was directed against the uncodified nature of the appropriations bill and not, as it implies, against the fact that the language of the codified portion of the public assistance act would not reflect the change. The situation here is not analogous to the Flanders case. It is a novel doctrine completely foreign to previous decisions of this court to suggest, as the majority seems to do, that article 2, section 37, requires not only the amendatory statute but also the affected statute to contain the full text of the amendatory language. To adopt the interpretation of the majority would hopelessly clutter the session laws and the code and lead to confusion, not clarity. It has not been before and should not now be the law of this state.
The Forest Practices Act of 1974 is a carefully drawn statute which attempts to provide sound policies of management for an important natural resource of the state. It provides for the kind of coordinated planning to protect the public interest which is also the goal of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971. See RCW 76.09.010; RCW 90.58.020. It has as one of its purposes the avoidance of unnecessary duplication in the regulations of forest practices. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 200, p. 665, both amended the existing Forest Practices Act of 1974, RCW 76.09, Laws of 1974, *744 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, p. 401, and transferred the power to regulate forest practices in the "shorelines" from one office of government — local government — to another office — the forest practices board. It is a complex statute which must be read carefully. But just because it is complex does not mean it is unconstitutional. The act meets our previously announced tests for constitutionality under article 2, section 37. It is constitutional, and this court should so find.
I dissent.
Brachtenbach and Hicks, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied June 21, 1979.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9624230. Public record. Not legal advice.