# People v. Jones

> California Supreme Court · August 25, 1988 · 46 Cal. 3d 585

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622815

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TIMOTHY JONES Et Al., Defendants and Appellants
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 25, 1988
- **Citations:** 46 Cal. 3d 585; 250 Cal. Rptr. 635; 758 P.2d 1165; 1988 Cal. LEXIS 169
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Arguelles
- **Judges:** Kaufman, Mosk, Arguelles
- **Cited by:** 174 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Goodliffe.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622815

## Opinion text

ARGUELLES, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not violate Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 or abuse its discretion in not sentencing defendants to the Youth Authority.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion as to the proper interpretation of Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c) (hereafter subdivision (c)). Although it is not as clear to me, as it apparently is to Justice Mosk, that the Legislature made a conscious decision to limit the application of subdivision (c) to cases in which a defendant has been convicted in the current proceeding of more than one enumerated sex offense, I do think that the language of subdivision (c) is ambiguous on this point, even when viewed in light of the legislative history set forth in the majority opinion. The sharp division in the Court of Appeal decisions which have addressed this question of statutory interpretation (see maj. opn., ante, p. 592, fn. 4) provides, I think, persuasive evidence that the statutory provision is at least reasonably susceptible to varying interpretations.
In light of the established principle of statutory construction—reiterated by Justice O’Connor in writing for the United States Supreme Court just a few months ago—“that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity” (United States v. Kozminski (1988) 487 U.S. _ [ 101 L.Ed.2d 788, 810 , 108 S.Ct. 2751, 2764 ]; see, e.g., Simpson v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 70, 77-78 , 98 S.Ct. 909 ]; People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 345 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 667 P.2d 686 ]), and in view of the fact that the Legislature could rationally have intended to reserve the more severe sentencing alternative of subdivision (c) for defendants who commit multiple sex offenses, I conclude that the statute should be interpreted to apply only to cases involving multiple sex offenses. If the Legislature believes that a “full, separate and consecutive sentence” should be an available sentencing option when a *611 defendant has committed only one enumerated sex offense, it can and should amend the statute to clearly so provide.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622815. Public record. Not legal advice.