# Jackson v. FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. > Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · March 6, 2008 · 518 F.3d 388 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622193 ## Case - **Full name:** Willie J. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC. and Federal Express Corporation, Inc., Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - **Decided:** March 6, 2008 - **Citations:** 518 F.3d 388; 90 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,122; 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1543; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4802; 2008 WL 596534 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Rogers - **Judges:** Denise, Martin, Rogers, Hood - **Cited by:** 74 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622193 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that the district court’s fact intensive inquiry on an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie claim was “misplaced” and that type of analysis was more appropriate in determining pretext - recognizing “that the appropriate test is to look at those factors relevant to the factual context, as opposed to a requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate similarity in all respects” - noting in this Title VII case, “the district court im-permissibly placed a burden of producing a significant amount of evidence in order to establish a prima facie case. That burden is not appropriate at the prima facie state [sic stage], but rather is better suited for the pr… - finding that the “purpose of. ..Section 1981 [is] not served by an overly narrow application of the similarly situated standard” - noting the court’s earlier disapproval of “a rigid standard of similarly situated that only took account of job functions” ## Opinion text ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. While I agree with the majority’s conceptual analysis and its conclusion that the appellant established a prima facie case at trial, I would affirm the district court on the alternative ground that FedEx demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Jackson’s termination, and that Jackson failed to show that reason to be a mere pretext for discrimination. Even though FedEx received a directed verdict at the close of Jackson’s case, it is apparent that each party had a full opportunity to present its evidence on the questions of whether there were legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Jackson’s termination, and if so, whether those reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Indeed, in its brief to this court, FedEx argued that it should prevail even if Jackson were found to have established a prima facie case because it had proven at trial that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Jackson. Likewise, Jackson argued in his initial brief, and in his reply brief, that the evidence he presented at trial had proven the appellee’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to be a pretext for discrimination. In light of the facts that both parties briefed those issues to this court, and that both parties obviously believe that they presented sufficient evidence at trial for the case to be decided on those issues, it would not be improper for this court to base its decision on those grounds. See Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir.1997). The legitimate, non-discriminatory reason behind Jackson’s termination is that he did not have the necessary experience or skills to be of use to his workgroup, which was engaged in designing and developing software for FedEx’s PowerPad project. That particular assignment was both the short-term and the long-term project for the workgroup. It required experienced programmers and business analysts who could design and develop software in C++, an object-oriented programming language similar to JAVA. Compared to the other people in the workgroup, Jackson did not have nearly the experience to be of assistance in the PowerPad project. Cathy Story, for example, had eleven years of experience in computer programming, with significant experience in JAVA programming; Virginia White had been a computer programmer for the previous 22 years; Glen Parham had received training in C + + programming and had been a programmer for the previous 28 years; Michael Griffith had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and had been a programmer for 27 years; James Morrison had a bachelor’s degree in computer science and had been a programmer for 21 years; and Mary Brown had been developing software as either a programmer or business analyst for the previous 30 years. Perhaps most importantly, each of these individuals had programmed or analyzed JAVA during the two years prior to Jackson’s termination. In short, these individ *398 uals had the skills and experience that the workgroup needed. Mr. Jackson, on the other hand, did not. In contrast to the other individuals in the workgroup, Jackson had not held a day-to-day programming job since the early-1970’s, and his only experiences with object-oriented programming were a four-day C++ class in 1994 and a three-day JAVA class in 1996. In fact, he admitted in his trial testimony that he never programmed in C + + or JAVA after taking those respective classes. Given Jackson’s lack of the requisite skills and experience, his termination was a legitimate, non-discriminatory decision on the part of FedEx. Because Jackson has presented no evidence that would allow an inference of discriminatory intent to be drawn from that decision, a jury could not reasonably find that FedEx’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Jackson was a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, I would affirm on those grounds. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9622193. Public record. Not legal advice.