# Cameron v. DeBoard > Oregon Supreme Court · April 18, 1962 · 230 Or. 411 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619991 ## Case - **Full name:** CAMERON Et Al v. DeBOARD Et Al; CAMERON Et Al v. MacINNES Et Al - **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court - **Decided:** April 18, 1962 - **Citations:** 230 Or. 411; 370 P.2d 709; 1962 Ore. LEXIS 316 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Sloan - **Judges:** Man, McAllister, Rossman, Warner, Perry, Sloan, O'Connell, Goodwin - **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619991 ## Opinion text SLOAN, J., dissenting. I dissent first because the court errs when it undertakes to adopt ground rules to guide the functions of an administrative agency. It is my view that the court has much exceeded the scope of review contemplated by the statutes here involved. Particularly when the *435 majority undertakes this voluntary assignment without first deciding what its scope .of review may be. I read the statutes, particularly ORS 652.275 to 657.-290, as imposing a limited duty on the reviewing court. It is noted, for example, that 657.280 delegates to the Commissioner the authority to make necessary rules and regulations governing the entire process, even the procedure to be followed by the Appeals Board. 657.290 grants the Commissioner power to review any decisions at any stage of the process, apparently even after final review by this court. 657.275 permits doubt that the Appeals Board is required to making findings at all. But perhaps more importantly the court reaches conclusions and imposes judgments on the administrator the repercussion of which we cannot know. We possess, at best, only a superficial knowledge of the problems this opinion may create. How this decision will affect the vexatious problems this ambiguous statute creates in the field of multi-union — multi-employer bargaining of varying geographical and jurisdictional limits, no one can know. I fear that we have added to the burden of the administrator, and the workers and employers, rather than relieved them. It must, of course, be recognized that the compensation fund must not be used as an agency to foment or support strikes. Neither should the denial of compensation in a proper case be permitted to deter legitimate bargaining rights. Secondly, in formulating its rules the majority has failed to give consideration to important facts and the knowledge that can, in part, be drawn from the facts. I refer particularly to the treatment of the test called integration. The majority only adumbrates *436 the real scope of the facts that makes the word integration rather useless in this case. For example, the majority gives little consideration to the fact that the Associated General Contractors is itself segregated into two divisions: the building division and the heavy and highway division. The significance of this separation, as it reflects on the subject of integration is plain. The two divisions negotiate separately with the crafts involved. Three of the crafts do not bargain with either division of the Association. The members of those crafts are usually employed by subcontractors and, therefore, bargain with the individual employers. It cannot be denied that there would be substantial integration or inter-dependence of work between the different crafts employed upon the same construction project. It is also probable that there would be similar inter-dependence between the employes of one employer who would be engaged in two or more projects at the same time. But even in that situation geographical location, differences in crafts employed or other facts could minimize the amount of integration involved. ORS 657.200 (2) recognizes this probability. I realize that the parties to this case did not press this question on this court for decision. But if the court is going to make a complete set of rules to govern the Commissioner, as it is doing, then these considerations cannot be ignored. There is a similar lack of consideration for the definition of premises contained in ORS 657.200 (1). That section limits the disqualification to those employed in the “same factory, establishment or other premises . . .” And that 657.200 (2) is the only statutory exception to the limitation of the same premises. *437 How a -premise is expanded to cover most of the state is unexplained. But the inter-dependence between the employes of a contractor building a grocery building in one community and those -of a bridge builder some place else is difficult to -see. Even more difficult to find is any relationship between a sheet metal worker employed in the shop of a subcontractor and a teamster, for example, delivering concrete on a highway project. Particularly when the workers live in different communities and where the actual relationship between employer and employe may widely vary. It requires little imagination to visualize other completely incongruous relationships that the majority would say can be considered to be integrated and inter-dependent each upon the other. The complexity of the problems presented by this case and the futility of this court’s attempt to make rules that will guide the administrator’s decisions could be demonstrated in much greater detail. It is not necessary. We should decide the case before us, nothing more. If the administrator decides he needs rules to apply to these cases he has the power to adopt them, OPS 657.280. That is an administrative function, not a judicial one. In respect to most of these claimants there was no integration in any measurable degree. The findings of the Appeals Board that the evidence of integration was not impressive was supported by the evidence. It is admitted that if the Board was talking about integration on a particular job site that the evidence would not support the statement. It is obvious that the Board was talking about over all integration of the variety of construction projects involved. N-or is there any evidence of indirect interest as *438 suggested by the majority. I have grave doubt that the statute permits a test of indirect or limited interest but even so, there is none shown here for most of the claimants. I agree that some of the claims require further evidence, but not all of them. The statute particularly enjoins the court to expedite decisions in these oases and to decide them. I think the judgment should be affirmed for all but a few of the claimants. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619991. Public record. Not legal advice.