# Jones v. State

> Supreme Court of Georgia · October 2, 2000 · 272 Ga. 900

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619005

## Case

- **Full name:** Jones v. the State
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Georgia
- **Decided:** October 2, 2000
- **Citations:** 272 Ga. 900; 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3806; 537 S.E.2d 80; 2000 Ga. LEXIS 681
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Benham
- **Judges:** Sears, Benham, Hunstein
- **Cited by:** 229 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled by Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862 (2019).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619005

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a failure to properly establish venue does not bar retrial, since evidence of venue does not go to the guilt or innocence of the accused and so does not invoke double jeopardy concerns
- finding that State failed to prove venue when only evidence presented was that murder victim’s neighbor’s home—across the street from victim’s home—was in Fulton County
- holding that the state must come forth in all criminal prosecutions with evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that venue is properly laid

## Opinion text

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion because I believe the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the state met its burden in establishing venue. Even if we assume that the State is required to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the State has met that burden is a question for the jury. Johns v. State, 239 Ga. 681 (1) ( 238 SE2d 372 ) (1977); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592 (2) ( 266 SE2d 201 ) (1980). As such, it is our duty to uphold the jury’s determination on this issue when there is sufficient evidence in the record authorizing a rational trier of fact to make such a finding. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
In the instant case, two witnesses testified as to venue. A Fulton County police investigator testified that the crime scene was on Evans Drive, and a neighbor to the victim testified he lived on Evans Drive; that Evans Drive is in Fulton County; and that the crime took place in a house directly across the street from the witness’s house. This evidence is more than sufficient to authorize a reasonable jury to find the prosecution proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt. While it is possible that houses that are directly across from one another, or even next door to each other, are in different counties since county lines may be drawn anywhere, there was no evidence in this case to suggest this possibility. Even if one were to speculate, reasonable people may differ as to whether this possibility creates a sufficient doubt under the law with respect to the venue question at hand because it is axiomatic that the majority of houses located opposite each other on a particular street will be located in the same county.
Neither is this conclusion affected by the holding in Bradley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 490 ( 519 SE2d 261 ) (1999). The majority cites Bradley for the proposition that “a street name, standing alone, is never sufficient to establish venue, because streets frequently run through more than one county.” Bradley is distinguishable from the instant case. In Bradley , the Court of Appeals, using the “slight evidence exception,” held that venue for the defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence and failure to maintain lane had not been established by a trooper’s testimony that he observed the defendant’s vehicle weaving on the northbound lane of Georgia Highway 5 and on Baptist Camp Road. The court ruled that since the trooper did not specify in which county Georgia Highway 5 or Baptist Camp Road were located, the jury had no evidence to determine in which county those streets were located. However, in the instant case, the witness specified that Evans Drive was located in Fulton *907 County and that the crime occurred in a house that was directly opposite his house on Evans Drive. Because this evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that venue was established beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent.
Decided October 2, 2000
Reconsideration denied October 20, 2000.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Anna E. Green, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9619005. Public record. Not legal advice.