# Nix v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 27, 2001 · 65 S.W.3d 664

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9617988

## Case

- **Full name:** Reginald Keith NIX, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 27, 2001
- **Citations:** 65 S.W.3d 664; 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52; 2001 WL 717453
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Johnson
- **Judges:** Hervey, Holcomb, Holland, Johnson, Keasler, Keller, Meyers, Price, Womack
- **Cited by:** 574 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated on other grounds by Wright, Sir Melvin Jr., 2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1162 (2016).
- Negative treatments: 3
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9617988

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a judgment is void when (1) the charging instrument does not satisfy the constitutional requisites of a charging instrument, (2) the trial court lacked subject matter over the offense charged, (3) the record reflects no evidence to support the conviction, or (4) a…
- explaining that because probation is not considered to be a “final” conviction, an application for writ of habeas corpus filed during the pendency of revocation proceedings is returnable to the trial court, whose ruling is reviewable by the court of appeals and subject to a pe…
- holding judgment of conviction is void when (1) charging instrument does not satisfy constitutional requisites, (2) trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over offense charged, (3) record establishes there is no evidence to support conviction, and (4) indigent defendant…
- stating that a void judgment is a “nullity” and can be attacked at any time and explaining that- a judgment is void only in very: rare situations, usually due to a lack of jurisdiction
- recognizing that if original judgment imposing deferred adjudication community supervision is void, subsequent revocation order and judgment adjudicating guilt are also void

## Opinion text

JOHNSON, J.,
joined by MEYERS, PRICE and HOLLAND, JJ., dissenting.
In the instant case, appellant was placed on deferred adjudication and, following adjudication of his guilt, he brought challenges to his original plea, based on alleged violations to his right of counsel and right to a jury trial. Today, a majority of this court precludes him from bringing such claims. Because I believe that such claims may be brought, I respectfully dissent.
As I have noted elsewhere, our case law establishes that on appeal from an order revoking probation (i.e., “regular” community supervision), a defendant is permitted to bring a challenge to the original conviction when such a challenge was for “fundamental error.” Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785-86 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Because we have equated deferred adjudication with “regular” community supervision for purposes of appeal, logic dictates that this same rule of fundamental error apply in the context of deferred adjudication. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-2 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 784-86 .
Today, however, the majority denies relief to appellant by overruling our “fundamental error”/“habeas corpus” case law. Ante, at 669-70; Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 784-87 . I have noted my dissent to this action. Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 787-89 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
The majority then goes on to declare that neither its decision today nor Manuel created a “new rule,” so that a retroactivity analysis is unnecessary. Ante, at 670-72. I disagree. Despite the fact that we never explicitly held that the “fundamental error” rule applied in the context of deferred adjudication, the logic of Manuel so dictated since, as noted above, Manuel's holding was explicitly predicated on its equating “regular” community supervision with deferred adjudication for purposes of appeal.
Based on the foregoing, as well as my dissent in Jordan , I dissent. 1
. The majority also states that "a judgment is void only in very rare situations — usually due to a lack of jurisdiction.” Ante, at 668. This statement is questionable in light of the Court’s recent decision in Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9617988. Public record. Not legal advice.