# Crawford v. Astrue

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · November 4, 2009 · 586 F.3d 1142

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9611251

## Case

- **Full name:** Clara CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee, v. Brian C. Shapiro, Real-Party-In-Interest-Appellant; Ruby Washington, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee, v. Young Cho, Real-Party-In-Interest-Appellant; Daphne M. Trejo, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee, v. Denise Bourgeois Haley, Real-Party-In-Interest-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 4, 2009
- **Citations:** 586 F.3d 1142; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24126; 2009 WL 3617989
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Clifton
- **Judges:** Kozinski, Schroeder, Fletcher, Pregerson, Reinhardt, Kleinfeld, Berzon, Rawlinson, Clifton, Bea, Smith
- **Cited by:** 1,028 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9611251

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that attorney fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b), 2 “in contrast” to fee awards assessed against the losing party under fee-shifting statutes, “are 3 not shifted. They are paid from the award of past-due benefits and the amount of the fee, 4 up to 25% of past-due …
- explaining that attorney fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b), “in contrast” to fee awards assessed against the losing party under fee- 24 shifting statutes, “are not shifted. They are paid from the award of past-due benefits and 25 the amount of the fee, up to 25% of past-due…
- explaining that courts should assess “the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue,” rather than social security cases in general, when 28 analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees
- holding 12 that section 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 13 reasonable” but “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits 14 awarded”
- holding 14 that section 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 15 reasonable” but “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits 16 awarded”

## Opinion text

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge KOZINSKI joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the district courts did not apply the proper standard in determining the amounts of fees awarded to the attorneys who represented the claimants in these cases. I thus concur in sections I, II, III-A, and III-B of the majority opinion.
I do not agree with the majority’s order that claimants’ attorneys be awarded the amounts they requested, however, and from that order I respectfully dissent. The cases should instead be remanded so that the respective district courts can determine reasonable fees by applying the proper standard. That is a task assigned to the district courts, not to us, and it is the expertise of the district courts that the Supreme Court referenced in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 , 122 S.Ct. 1817 , 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002)- (“Judges of our district courts are accustomed to making reasonableness determinations in a wide variety of contexts, and their assessments in such matters, in the event of an appeal, ordinarily qualify for highly respectful review.”)
The majority opinion sets a poor example for district courts to follow. It orders payments that translate into hourly rates, for the time of both attorneys and paralegals, of $519 in Washington, $875 in Crawford, and $902 in Trejo. But, as described in more detail in Judge Bea’s dissenting opinion, the majority opinion provides no serious explanation of why these awards are reasonable or why they do not represent “windfalls.” It instructs district courts to “look at the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue to determine how much risk the firm assumed in taking the case,” supra at 1153, but it does not comply with that requirement itself, not even in the Washington case, where the district court found that claimant’s counsel faced “very little risk.” It acknowledges, supra at 1146, the finding by the district court in the Trejo case that 1.4 hours of reported attorney time and 1.5 hours of paralegal time did not properly relate to the federal court action, but it still awards the claimant’s attorney the full amount of fees requested, with no reduction for the inappropriate time entries.
It is not obvious to me that there is no “windfall” in any of the fee requests made by claimants’ attorneys. It would not necessarily constitute an abuse of discretion for a district court to decline to award the full amounts requested. Awarding the attorneys what they ask for brings an end to *1154 this matter without requiring a remand, but it does not satisfy our obligation under the statute to protect the interests of the claimants themselves, from whose past benefits the money is taken. In future cases, the district courts should do as we say, not as we do.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9611251. Public record. Not legal advice.
