# People v. Beardslee

> California Supreme Court · March 25, 1991 · 53 Cal. 3d 68

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610050

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DONALD JAY BEARDSLEE, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** March 25, 1991
- **Citations:** 53 Cal. 3d 68; 279 Cal. Rptr. 276; 91 Daily Journal DAR 3490; 806 P.2d 1311; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2101; 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1157
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Broussard
- **Judges:** Arabian, Mosk, Broussard
- **Cited by:** 354 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610050

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that if there are several acts on which separate criminal offenses could be found, the jury must agree on the act forming the basis for the conviction

## Opinion text

BROUSSARD,J.
I concur in the majority opinion with regard to the judgment of guilt and the special circumstance findings, but, for the first reason discussed in Justice Mosk’s opinion, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the penalty judgment. As the majority opinion acknowledges, the United States Supreme Court established in Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ], that a primary factor to be considered in determining whether subsequently obtained evidence is tainted by a prior illegality is “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct” at issue. (See generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed. 1987) § 11.4(b), pp. 395-398, and cases cited.) Given “the purpose and flagrancy” of the Missouri police officer’s misconduct in the 1970 Missouri proceedings and the evident causal relationship between that misconduct and defendant’s subsequent admissions in the California proceedings, I believe the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Missouri offense at the penalty phase of defendant’s trial. Further, as Justice Mosk explains, in light of the substantial mitigating evidence presented on defendant’s behalf at the penalty phase, the erroneous admission of the Missouri evidence was clearly prejudicial. Accordingly, I would reverse the penalty judgment and remand for a new penalty trial, to ensure that the decision whether defendant should live or die is made free of the taint of egregious police misconduct.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 5, 1991, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610050. Public record. Not legal advice.