# People v. Beardslee > California Supreme Court · March 25, 1991 · 53 Cal. 3d 68 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610048 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DONALD JAY BEARDSLEE, Defendant and Appellant - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** March 25, 1991 - **Citations:** 53 Cal. 3d 68; 279 Cal. Rptr. 276; 91 Daily Journal DAR 3490; 806 P.2d 1311; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2101; 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1157 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Mosk - **Judges:** Arabian, Mosk, Broussard - **Cited by:** 354 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610048 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that if there are several acts on which separate criminal offenses could be found, the jury must agree on the act forming the basis for the conviction ## Opinion text MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the judgment as to guilt and death eligibility. After review, I have found no error warranting reversal on those issues. 1 I dissent from the judgment, however, as to the penalty of death. My reasons are two in number. The first is that the admission of the evidence of the Missouri homicide was reversible error. As to whether or not error was committed, the facts are undisputed. Captain Jack Patty of the St. Louis (Missouri) County Police Department deliberately violated defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when he sought, and obtained, a confession relating to the murder of Laura Griffin. Patty then intentionally perjured himself at a hearing to suppress the confession in order to cover up his illegal conduct. Patty’s violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, and his subsequent perjury at the suppression hearing, tainted the evidence of the killing. The question to be resolved can be stated simply: Was the taint purged? The answer is clear—and it is negative. Whatever “purgative” force might have inhered in the actions and events following Captain Patty’s illegal conduct, it must be deemed ineffectual. The reason is plain: Patty’s misconduct—the deliberate violation of a defendant’s federal constitutional *119 rights, and the subsequent intentional perjury to cover up the illegality— was most flagrant and grievous; the taint flowing therefrom was accordingly very dark and deep. I need not state what is apparent for all to see. Patty’s actions do not constitute a mere misstep involving some so-called “technicality.” Rather, they amount to a purposeful attack not only on the truth-seeking function of the system of adjudication but also on the very rule of law itself. Turning from the fact of error to its consequences, I believe that reversal is required under either of the potentially applicable standards for harmless-error analysis, viz., the “reasonable doubt” test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], which governs federal constitutional error, and the “reasonable possibility” test of People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ], which governs state law error occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial. The evidence introduced at the penalty phase showed that defendant was an excellent employee, a model student, and in general a decent and law-abiding citizen. It also showed that he participated in the brutal murder of Patty Geddling and Stacy Benjamin. In early 1981 he befriended Ricki Soria and attempted to free her from drugs and the drug underworld, including such characters as Frank Rutherford, William Forrester, and Ed Geddling. Two months later, at their urging, he became involved with Soria and the others in the killings. Aside from the Missouri homicide, there had been no other criminal activity on defendant’s part. The question of penalty must be considered close. To be sure, the evidence in aggravation was substantial. But substantial too was the evidence in mitigation. The closeness of the question is apparent on the face of the record. And it is confirmed by the manifest difficulty the jury experienced in reaching its decision—it deliberated almost 23 hours over 4 days—and by the differing verdicts it returned—death for the murder of Geddling and life imprisonment for the murder of Benjamin. 2 In view of the foregoing, I believe that there is a reasonable possibility that but for the erroneous admission of the evidence of the Missouri homicide, the outcome would have been more favorable to defendant. Hence, I cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. My second reason for dissenting as to penalty is the presence of so-called “intracase” disproportionality violative of the cruel and unusual punish *120 ments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant, Rutherford, Forrester, Soria, and Ed Geddling were all engaged in the common criminal enterprise that culminated in the two murders. Nevertheless, only defendant was condemned to death. I recognize that “intracase” disproportionality may be found only if the capital punishment system has operated in an arbitrary and capricious manner. (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 ]; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 121 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 757 P.2d 569 ].) Plainly, the system operated in such a manner here. It would indeed have been rational to subject defendant and the others to severe punishment for the two murders. It would even have been rational to treat each of the participants somewhat differently on the ground that each engaged in distinct conduct and entertained a distinct state of mind. But— put simply—it is altogether irrational to take the life of defendant in punishment for the killings and to spare the lives of all the others. For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the judgment of death. In passing, I note that the trial court erred by refusing the jury’s request for further instruction on the law—and erred egregiously. Under Penal Code section 1138—which was enacted in 1872 and has remained substantially unchanged since—the court is required to satisfy such a request. (E.g., People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1259 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 451 , 792 P.2d 251 ].) On this record, however, no prejudice appears. All the same, I feel compelled to note the impropriety and to state my strong disapproval. The majority’s assertion, “this was not a close case on the question of penalty” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 113), assumes that the evidence of the Missouri homicide was properly admitted. Even if the assumption were sound, the assertion would be highly dubious, at the very best. But since, as explained above, the assumption is without support, so too is the assertion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9610048. Public record. Not legal advice.