# People v. Brown > Supreme Court of Colorado · October 14, 1986 · 726 P.2d 638 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607681 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, v. Nolan L. BROWN, Attorney-Respondent - **Court:** Supreme Court of Colorado - **Decided:** October 14, 1986 - **Citations:** 726 P.2d 638; 1986 Colo. LEXIS 632 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Dubofsky - **Judges:** Rovira, Dubofsky - **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607681 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that public official attorney's conduct including forgery and abuse of public records warranted disbarment ## Opinion text DUBOFSKY, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The hearing board and the hearing panel of the grievance committee recommended that the respondent, Nolan L. Brown, be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. However, when the recommendation was presented to this court, we issued a rule to show cause why the respondent should not be disbarred. In response to our order, the disciplinary prosecutor reviewed the cases in which this court has imposed disbarment and concluded that the appropriate discipline for the respondent would be a three-year suspension. 1 Nevertheless, the majority con- *642 eludes that the conviction of a district attorney of two felonies and a misdemeanor while in office warrants disbarment, relying on People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 (1980); People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 (Colo.1986); People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo.1985); and section 5.21 ABA, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Given the circumstances that provided the basis for the respondent’s convictions in this case, I do not believe that disbarment is an appropriate sanction. 2 The respondent did not commit three crimes separately; rather, a single discussion with the employee of the department of motor vehicles supported convictions under three different criminal statutes: second-degree forgery, a class 4 felony; abuse of public records, a class 1 misdemeanor, and computer crime, a class 4 felony. The disciplinary prosecutor’s survey of previous Colorado attorney discipline case law informs us that the disbarment cases fall into two categories: (1) convictions for embezzlement or theft, usually of client monies, People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo.1986); People v. Buckles, 673 P.2d 1008 (Colo.1984); People v. Swope, 621 P.2d 321 (Colo.1981); People v. Hilgers, 200 Colo. 211 , 612 P.2d 1134 (1980); People v. McMichael, 199 Colo. 433 , 609 P.2d 633 (1980); People v. Silvola, 195 Colo. 74 , 575 P.2d 413 (1978); People v. Peters, 151 Colo. 409 , 378 P.2d 205 (1963); People v. Buckles, 140 Colo. 261 , 343 P.2d 1046 (1959); People v. More, 125 Colo. 571 , 245 P.2d 467 (1952); People v. Bentall, 97 Colo. 526 , 51 P.2d 352 (1935); People v. Kaufman, 90 Colo. 8 , 5 P.2d 1114 (1931); and (2) convictions for manufacturing, sale or distribution of drugs, People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (1981); People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 (relied upon by the majority here); People v. McGonigle, 198 Colo. 315 , 600 P.2d 61 (Colo.1979); People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389 , 490 P.2d 954 (1971). People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 , relied upon by the majority for the discipline imposed in this case, involved both thefts from clients and possession of illegal drugs. Fitzke, as temporary guardian and conservator for an elderly and incapacitated woman, embezzled $19,-000 from her estate. Fitzke was convicted of theft in Nebraska and unlawful distribution and possession of a controlled substance in Denver. Fitzke was disbarred in Nebraska, and his Denver law firm filed criminal charges against him for conversion of funds. The disciplinary prosecutor found Only two Colorado cases involving disbarment that fell outside the pattern described. In People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 , the third case relied upon by the majority, the respondent was disbarred after pleading guilty to the felony of knowingly, and with intent to defraud, making, drawing, and issuing certain obligations of a federal deposit insurance corporation insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982). Lo-seke, the senior trust officer of a Fort Morgan bank, secured his trading in options to sell or buy common stock by forging bank guaranty letters over a period of a year and a half. He was sentenced to three years in federal prison, a term subsequently reduced to eighteen months. Lo-seke made restitution of $326,000 to the bank for its repurchase of the guaranty letters. In People v. Salazar, 185 Colo. 331 , 524 P.2d 298 (1974), the respondent was disbarred after his conviction of two felonies for violation of federal banking regulations for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for three years. Salazar was a shareholder, director and attorney for a bank with which he arranged a $65,000 loan for other bank shareholders. The severity of the sanctions in Loseke and Sala *643 zar was related to misconduct in handling money belonging to the public. There have been two prior cases in Colorado concerning misconduct by a prosecutor. In People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 , the respondent, a deputy district attorney in Telluride, Colorado, paid $5,000 to undercover narcotics agents to obtain a share of the profits from the importation of drugs from Mexico. Unruh purchased cocaine for one of the undercover agents, used cocaine in the presence of an agent, and agreed to hide a fugitive from justice. Although Unruh was charged with several criminal offenses, he pled guilty to being a disorderly person, a misdemeanor offense. This court’s decision to disbar Unruh relied upon cases from other jurisdictions disbarring attorneys involved in the importation or distribution of narcotic drugs. In addition, we noted that Unruh’s misconduct was aggravated because of his position as a deputy district attorney. The other case involving misconduct by a prosecutor is People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680 (Colo.1983). Tucker, the district attorney for the Ninth Judicial District, sustained two felony convictions for embezzlement of public property. After both convictions were reversed on appeal, Tucker, was convicted of second degree official misconduct, a petty offense, and failure to disclose a conflict of interest, a misdemean- or. A subsequent grievance complaint additionally charged Tucker with making a key witness for the prosecution unavailable to testify during his trial for embezzlement. Tucker had received a prior letter of admonition from the grievance committee for other misconduct during his tenure as district attorney. All of this resulted in a suspension from the practice of law for one year and one day. At the time this court entered the suspension order, Tucker had been subject to an interim suspension of almost five years. The disciplinary prosecutor, in making a recommendation that the respondent in the case before us be suspended for no more than three years, compares the instant case to the Tucker and Unruh cases. The prosecutor argues that suspension is appropriate because the misconduct here related to the respondent’s personal affairs and did not involve the mishandling of client funds, public funds, or drug trafficking. The prosecutor notes that the respondent’s abuse of his official position to seek a change in his motor vehicle department driving record in an attempt to gain more favorable insurance rates for the family cars was less serious misconduct than that in Tucker and Unruh . The hearing board, in making its recommendation of suspension of one year and one day, considered section 5.21, “Failure to Maintain the Public Trust,” of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provides, “Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly misuses a position with the intent to obtain a significant benefit or advantage for himself or another_” The board determined that the respondent knowingly used his position to obtain a benefit for himself, but the board refused to recommend disbarment because the benefit sought was so insignificant. As the board noted, “On the one hand, that which was ultimately obtained monetarily suggests that respondent could not conceivably risk so much for so little. On the other hand, his conduct suggests the sort of arrogant attitude which often typifies one’s possession of immense powers.” The hearing board weighed the respondent’s conviction of felony offenses committed while serving as an elected district attorney and the impact of such conduct on the public, our system of justice, and the legal profession against the respondent’s prior unblemished record and punishment as a felon that resulted in the loss of his job and the loss of his personal and political reputation. Although the hearing board and the hearing panel recommended a suspension of one year and one day, I agree with the disciplinary prosecutor’s recommendation of a suspension for three years, primarily because the respondent’s misconduct involved the use of his office as district attorney to violate the law. The respondent has *644 been subject to an interim suspension since October 17, 1985. The interim suspension, added to a three year suspension, would result in a four year suspension, discipline that I think is more appropriate than disbarment in this case. . Prior to the hearing before the hearing board, the disciplinary prosecutor offered to enter into a Conditional Admission of Misconduct with the respondent that would recommend a three-year suspension. At the hearing, in response to a question from the presiding officer of the hearing panel concerning the penalty to be imposed, the disciplinary prosecutor asserted that disbarment in this case would be inappropriate: It is an isolated incident, obviously, that we have before us. It is one incident that we’re looking at, even though it supports three different criminal convictions. It’s not a pattern of misconduct and doesn’t involve anything as *642 serious as drugs or drug dealing or hiding fugitives. So I felt, in looking at it, that it certainly would not support disbarment. . Under C.R.C.P. 241.22(a) a lawyer who has been disbarred may seek readmission eight years after the effective date of the order of disbarment. To be readmitted, the lawyer must demonstrate his fitness to practice law and his professional competence, must successfully complete the written examination for admission to the bar and demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence his rehabilitation and full compliance with all applicable disciplinary orders. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607681. Public record. Not legal advice.