# Strickland v. State

> Court of Appeals of Georgia · December 4, 1996 · 223 Ga. App. 772

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607524

## Case

- **Full name:** Strickland v. the State
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Georgia
- **Decided:** December 4, 1996
- **Citations:** 223 Ga. App. 772; 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 4328; 479 S.E.2d 125; 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1294
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Smith
- **Judges:** Ruffin, Beasley, McMurray, Birdsong, Blackburn, Pope, Andrews, Johnson, Smith, Banke
- **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718 (2015).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607524

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that sexual battery requires only general intent

## Opinion text

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
. I concur fully with the conclusion that the trial court did not erroneously refuse to give Strickland’s requested charge. Given this conclusion, I do not agree that this case is an Appropriate vehicle for discussion of whether sexual battery may be a lesser included offense of child molestation as a matter of fact. Had evidence been presented that Strickland committed sexual battery, a discussion of this issue would likely be necessary because our holding then would depend on the issue of whether sexual battery could ever be included in the offense of child molestation. The opinion notes, though, that the evidence demanded one of only two conclusions: Strickland was guilty “of child molestation or nothing.” As in Rash v. State, 207 Ga. App. 585, 588 (6) ( 428 SE2d 799 ) (1993), our holding could be based on the simple fact that the evidence presented could not have supported a charge on sexual battery. Because the issue of whether sexual battery could ever be included as a matter of fact in the offense of child molestation is not dispositive of the issue in this case, the discussion in Division 1 (a) is premature.
Furthermore, I am concerned that the conclusion reached in Division 1 (a) might thwart the statutory scheme, embodied in OCGA §§ 16-6-3, 16-6-4, and 16-6-5, that protects children of tender years against sexual offenses. Although these statutes are mentioned in footnote 1, the opinion does not address and resolve the potential conflict of a holding that sexual battery may be a lesser included *781 offense of child molestation with the special legislative considerations afforded to children under 16.
Decided December 4, 1996
William W. Keith III, Karen E. Luffman, for appellant.
Roger G. Queen, District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews, Judge Johnson and Senior Appellate Judge Harold R. Banke join in this special concurrence.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9607524. Public record. Not legal advice.