# Schenekl v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · October 25, 2000 · 30 S.W.3d 412

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9604497

## Case

- **Full name:** George Kenneth SCHENEKL, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** October 25, 2000
- **Citations:** 30 S.W.3d 412; 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 97; 2000 WL 1584882
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Meyers
- **Judges:** Keasler, McCormick, Mansfield, Keller, Womack, Meyers, Holland, Johnson, Price
- **Cited by:** 40 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9604497

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that section 31.124 is constitutional in its provision that an officer may stop and board a boat without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to perform a water safety check
- recognizing that delays exceeding eight months are generally considered presumptively unreasonable and sufficient to trigger a speedy trial analysis

## Opinion text

*417 MEYERS, J.,
delivered this concurring opinion, joined by JOHNSON and HOLLAND, JJ.
It ought to be emphasized that the search authorized by the statute in question is narrow in scope and may not exceed its stated purpose, absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause. As stated by the Court of Appeals in this case:
The enforcement provision authorizes detention only for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the registration and safety requirements. See Tex. Paeks & Wild.Code Ann. § 31.124. The intrusion is minimal in scope because the search may only be directed at the safety items listed in the statute. Further, while the boat must carry several safety and registration items, only a brief visual inspection is necessary to determine compliance. Therefore, the scope and length of the seizure favor a finding that the intrusion is minimal.
Schenekl v. State, 996 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1999) (emphasis added). An officer conducting a random safety and regulatory compliance inspection under Chapter 31 could inspect the boat for the following items:
1. The vessel’s certificate of number. TexParks & Wild.Code Ann. § 31.028 (certificate of number shall be carried on board vessel);
2. Identification number and validation decal. Id. at § 31.032 (identification number and validation decal shall be painted on or attached to side of vessel near bow);
3. Manufacturer’s identification number. Id. at § 31.043 (vessels manufactured in Texas for sale and vessels sold, numbered or titled in Texas shall carry manufacturer’s hull identification number clearly imprinted on structure of vessel or displayed on plate permanently attached to vessel);
4.Lights. Id. at § 31.064;
5. Sound-producing devices. Id. at § 31.065;
6. Life preserving devices. Id. at § 31.066;
7. Fire extinguishers. Id. at § 31.067;
8. Flame arrester or backfire trap on carburetors of gasoline engines, with the exception of outboard motors. Id. at § 31.068;
9. Ventilators for bilges of engine and fuel tank compartments, with the exception of open boats. Id. at § 31.069;
10. Exhaust water manifold or muffler installed on engine. Id. at § 31.070; and
11. Rearview mirror (in certain circumstances where persons are being ■ towed). Id. at § 31.071.
This is not an unwieldy list. An officer could determine compliance with all of these requirements by a visual inspection in a matter of minutes; a search of interior compartments on the boat would not generally be necessary.
I would note that United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 , 103 S.Ct. 2573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983), and other case law involving searches of boats by federal customs agents or Coast Guard, are concerned with vessels that have access to the open seas. This fact was one of the most weighty considerations in Villamonte-Marquez . While we are not concerned in this case with vessels that have access to the open sea, the search authorized by the statute here is nonetheless reasonable in view of its limited scope, the brevity in which such search can be conducted, the lack of alternative means for enforcement, and the public interest in ensuring compliance with the water safety regulations.
■ With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9604497. Public record. Not legal advice.