# Hatley v. Stafford

> Oregon Supreme Court · December 19, 1978 · 284 Or. 523

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602501

## Case

- **Full name:** HATLEY, Respondent, v. STAFFORD, Defendant, and STAFFORD Et Al, Appellants
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 19, 1978
- **Citations:** 284 Or. 523; 588 P.2d 603; 1978 Ore. LEXIS 1259
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Lent
- **Judges:** Howell, Lent
- **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602501

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the legislature, in adopting the parol evidence rule without mention of any exceptions, intended to codify the existing common-rule, but not to preclude judicial recognition of exceptions to it
- stating that, to be “inconsistent” within the meaning of the parol evidence rule, the oral term must contradict an express provision in the writing
- explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply when the writing is not complete and contains only part of the agreement
- applying “the general rule that statutes codifying the common law are to be construed in a manner consistent with the common law”

## Opinion text

LENT, J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The majority opinion and the result thereby achieved in this case make the statute meaningless. The statute is clear:
*537 "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives or successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement, other than the contents of the writing, * * ORS 41.740
It excludes any evidence of the terms of an agreement reduced to writing other than the agreement itself. The statute would have to read differently to permit legislatively what this court permits by "interpreting” or "construing” the statute. The effect of this court’s decisions has been to revise the statutory language to provide somewhat as follows:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is not to be considered as containing all those terms if there is oral testimony or evidence other than the contents of the writing that the agreement is incomplete.”
If that is what the legislature meant to say, it is surprising that they chose the language now found in ORS 41.740 (which is unchanged from Sec. 682 of the Act of October 11, 1862).
The majority says that the statute is a codification of the parol evidence rule known to the common law, and therefore, the exceptions to the common law rule are an existing but unwritten list of exceptions to the statute. Not only that, but the majority seems to say further that whenever a common law court constructs another exception, this court may, if it finds the exception seemly, adopt it as an implied amendment to the 1862 Act. Would the majority apply the statute as written if the next legislative assembly were to reenact the Act of October 11,1862, and add: "And this time we mean it”?
Were the statute applied as written, those who take the trouble to reduce their agreement to writing should be reasonably certain as to their rights and obligations. Trials would be simpler and cheaper. If it *538 be said that the statute is harsh, I know of no better way to demonstrate its harshness or unfairness than to apply it strictly. The legislature could then actually enact a statute which would read as the majority’s version of the present statute.
As to the case at bar the majority says that what the plaintiff contends was an unwritten part and parcel of the written agreement is not "inconsistent” with the part actually written. This will surely surprise the defendant who finds that by the opinion in this case "not to exceed 70 [dollars] per acre” is consistent with $400 per acre. Although he had no lawyer to advise him at the time of making his writing, this plaintiff farmer cannot be so lacking in sophistication as to know or realize that it’s just as easy to write "400.00” as it is to write "70.00” if that is truly what the parties intended and agreed.
The majority says generally:
"This is not to say, however, that the trial court should readily admit parol evidence whenever one of the parties claims a writing does not include all the terms of an agreement. The court should presume that the writing was intended to be a complete integration, at least when the writing is complete on its face, and should admit evidence of consistent additional terms only if there is substantial evidence that the parties did not intend the writing to embody the entire agreement.”
Whatever the majority may mean by "substantial evidence” the rule just set forth should defeat this plaintiff’s claim, not vindicate it. The writing is complete on its face, the additional terms are not consistent, and the "substantial evidence” is the plaintiff’s testimony.
I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602501. Public record. Not legal advice.