# Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, Inc.

> Court of Appeals of North Carolina · February 4, 1986 · 79 N.C. App. 51

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602392

## Case

- **Full name:** Pinehurst, Inc. and Pinehurst Receivables Associates, Inc. v. O’leary Brothers Realty, Inc., Timothy W. O’leary, and Dennis O’leary
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 4, 1986
- **Citations:** 79 N.C. App. 51; 338 S.E.2d 918; 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 1982
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Phillips
- **Judges:** Becton, Phillips, Eagles
- **Cited by:** 43 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602392

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that punitive damages may not be recovered for unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of North Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Statute
- finding unwarranted refusal in part because defendants considered their Chapter 75 violation to be “an acceptable business practice”
- finding unwarranted refusal in part because defendants considered their Chapter 75 violation to be a permissible business practice

## Opinion text

Judge PHILLIPS
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with everything said in the majority opinion except the ruling setting aside the award of punitive damages. That *66 defendants’ conduct violated the state’s public policy enunciated in Chapter 75 has been established; it has also been established that the violation was committed in a manner that would warrant the award of punitive damages if the offense violated a common law rule instead of statutory policy. The Legislature clearly intended to encourage victims of unfair or deceptive practices to help enforce the statutory policy by suing violators of it; and that malicious violators of the Act be punished by the civil courts. And it also intended, it seems to me, that where trebling the damages will not promote these statutory purposes that punitive damages suitable to the wrongful and unethical character of the offense be assessed in accord with existing law. Under the aggravated circumstances of this case, which are not unique since deceitful and unfair conduct is not confined to transactions involving large sums, limiting plaintiffs’ recovery and the sanctions against defendants to $3.00 makes a mockery of our Fair Trade Practices Act, as it permits a malicious violation of statutory policy to go unpunished and denies fair compensation to victims who have aided the State in enforcing its policy. And in my opinion the law requires no such holding. The common law doctrine of punitive damages has not been repealed; it is available for use by our courts in appropriate cases; this is an appropriate case for its use; and referring the question back to the General Assembly is in effect a failure to function as the General Assembly manifestly expects us to, since their task is to set policy, not decide details which arise in the trial of cases, and ours is to enforce and implement the policy adopted. I would affirm the award of punitive damages by the trial judge. I would also hold that punitive damages may be awarded where a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 is malicious, wilful and for an improper purpose and where trebling the actual damages suffered would neither punish the wrongdoer nor encourage victims to enforce the statutory policy.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9602392. Public record. Not legal advice.