# People v. Sidener

> California Supreme Court · October 25, 1962 · 58 Cal. 2d 645

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9600652

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT KARL SIDENER, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 25, 1962
- **Citations:** 58 Cal. 2d 645; 25 Cal. Rptr. 697; 375 P.2d 641; 1962 Cal. LEXIS 298
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by White
- **Judges:** Traynor, Schauer, White
- **Cited by:** 98 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled by People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89 (1970).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9600652

## Opinion text

WHITE, J., Dissenting.
I am in accord and concur with the historical narrative and legal reasoning contained in the dissenting opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Schauer.
While the Legislature is empowered to place certain reasonable restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts, nevertheless, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, the legislative prerogative in that regard is limited to such restrictions as “do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those [judicial] functions.” And, as recently as 1956, in People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45 [ 301 P.2d 241 ], this court held that the determination of the factor which results in the imposition of increased punishment is inherently vested in the courts.
I view with alarm this invasion of the powers of the judicial department of government by the legislative department. If the power of the courts, in the interest of justice, to control the dismissal of a prior conviction can be made subject to the approval of the district attorney, then what is to prevent the Legislature from providing that the finding as to whether an allegation of a prior conviction is true or untrue under the laws of this state shall also be vested in the district attorney ? I sometimes think we are inclined to forget that under our philosophy of government the district attorney is but the representative of just another litigant in a criminal prosecution. He is invested with the power to institute prosecutions but once he has done so, the determination of the truth or falsity of such accusations is for the courts.
Another alarming feature of the statute here under consideration is that, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, it takes away all judicial discretion in the pronouncement of sentence and invests the district attorney with plenary power to control the pronouncement of judgment without any right of judicial review.
Such an enactment under the American way of life seems to me the very essence of slavery and a return to the philosophy of “the Divine Eight of Kings.” After all, the district *675 attorney cannot be regarded as impartial. He is essentially an advocate who, believing in the justice of his cause, is seeking conviction and punishment of the accused. To make him also the court of last resort as to what punishment should be imposed, without any impartial tribunal to review his decision in the matter of sentencing, seems to me to do violence to our concept of constitutional government, and offends our oft repeated and proud boast that we are a government of law and not of men.
I regard section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code, now engaging our attention, as a legislative encroachment upon proper judicial power and therefore, unconstitutional.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the court below for further proceedings as set forth in the last paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 21, 1962. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9600652. Public record. Not legal advice.