# Ling v. Jan's Liquors

> Supreme Court of Kansas · July 17, 1985 · 237 Kan. 629

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9599850

## Case

- **Full name:** Lyllis Ling, Appellant, v. Jan’s Liquors, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Kansas
- **Decided:** July 17, 1985
- **Citations:** 237 Kan. 629; 703 P.2d 731; 1985 Kan. LEXIS 429
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Holmes
- **Judges:** Schroeder, Holmes, Lockett, McFarland, Herd, Prager, Miller
- **Cited by:** 207 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9599850

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “Indeed, we have not hesitated to adopt a new cause of action by judicial decision where we have determined that course was compelled by changing circumstances,” but refusing to impose civil liability upon vendors of alcoholic beverages for torts of inebriated patrons …
- recognizing that the serving of liquor to a minor or an inebriated person may initiate a foreseeable chain of events but still refusing to hold the tavern owner liable for negligence due to public policy concerns
- holding that “under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), it is possible to bring suit in Kansas to recover damages for injuries occurring in this state which resulted from negligent conduct outside the state”
- stating under Kansas choice of law rules, the applicable law for tort claims is the law of the state where the aggrieved party suffered injury
- stating that Kansas law applies the law of the state where the tort was committed

## Opinion text

Holmes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority opinion that under the common law as it exists in this state there is no liability in this case and that the trial court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs case for failure to state a cause of action. When the legislature, in 1949, repealed R.S. 1923, 21-2150, it would appear obvious that it intended the common law to prevail. As pointed out by the majority opinion, the legislature has, on numerous occasions, revised our liquor control laws but has failed to re-enact legislation creating the cause of action sought by plaintiff and it is not our position to do so. Hence, I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion.
I disagree with that portion of the opinion which would apply long-arm jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) to the facts of this case. The tortious act of the defendant in selling liquor to a minor in Missouri is too far removed from the auto accident occurring hours later, in Kansas, to be considered the “commission of a tortious act within this state” as required by the statute. While plaintiffs unfortunate injuries were suffered in Kansas, they were not, in my opinion, the result of any tortious act committed in Kansas by Jan’s Liquors. The tortious act of this defendant was complete upon the sale of the liquor in Missouri. There are not *642 sufficient minimum contacts in this case to justify personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 90 L. Ed. 95 , 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945); Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 233 Kan. 324 , 662 P.2d 553 (1983).
McFarland and Herd, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9599850. Public record. Not legal advice.