# Worthington v. Bynum

> Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 4, 1982 · 305 N.C. 478

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9598042

## Case

- **Full name:** Ben F. Worthington v. William Anderson Bynum; And Jesse Cogdell, Jr. v. William Anderson Bynum
- **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 4, 1982
- **Citations:** 305 N.C. 478; 290 S.E.2d 599; 1982 N.C. LEXIS 1345
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Carlton
- **Judges:** Copeland, Carlton, Britt, Mitchell, Meyer
- **Cited by:** 185 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9598042

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing -4- JUSTUS V. ROSNER Martin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part that “[d]ue to their active participation in the trial, their first-hand acquaintance with the evidence presented, their observances of the parties, the witnesses, the jurors and the attor…
- recognizing that "[d]ue to their active participation in the trial, their first-hand acquaintance with the evidence presented, their observances of the parties, the witnesses, the jurors and the attorneys involved, and their knowledge of various other attendant circumstances, …
- stating that "it is plain that a trial judge's discretionary order pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown"
- noting also the authority of state "trial judges ... to set aside the verdict whenever in their sound discretion they believe it necessary to attain justice for all concerned"

## Opinion text

Justice Carlton
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I wish to add, however, that I do not necessarily agree that the damages awarded these plaintiffs were excessive. My vote is based on agreement with the majority that the trial judge should be entrusted with broad discretionary power in ruling on a Rule 59 motion. An appellate court, reviewing the case on the cold record before it, should not disturb an able trial judge’s ruling on a discretionary matter merely because it believes some other award for damages would be more appropriate. Reversals of such rulings should occur only when it is clear that the trial judge manifestly abused his discretion.
I am sympathetic to the view expressed in dissent that a more specific standard of review would be preferable. The problem is that I have not seen a meaningful standard suggested. Until such time that someone can suggest a more meaningful standard than the nebulous one of determining whether an award was within “the maximum limit of a reasonable range,” I would prefer to stay with the majority vote.
The only condition that I would place upon the exercise of the broad discretionary power approved by the majority would be to require the trial judge to specify the ground or grounds upon which his ruling is based. This requirement would amount to no real limitation of the trial judge’s discretionary power and would, at the same time, enable appellate courts to determine more accurately whether an abuse of discretion has been committed.
Justice Meyer joins in this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9598042. Public record. Not legal advice.