# State Road Commission v. Curry

> West Virginia Supreme Court · March 28, 1972 · 155 W. Va. 819

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589896

## Case

- **Full name:** The State Road Commission of West Virginia v. Devon D. Curry and Alberta Curry
- **Court:** West Virginia Supreme Court
- **Decided:** March 28, 1972
- **Citations:** 155 W. Va. 819; 187 S.E.2d 632; 1972 W. Va. LEXIS 226
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Haymond
- **Judges:** Calhoun, Haymond
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589896

## Opinion text

Haymond, Judge,
dissenting:
I concur in the action of the majority in denying the motion of the defendant landowners to dismiss as improvidently awarded the writ of error and supersedeas granted by this Court on June 8, 1970; but I emphatically dissent from the holding of the majority as set forth in Point 6 of the syllabus which permits the buddings and the land on which the permanent easement taken in this proceeding is located to be valued separately in violation of the well 'established general rule expressly recognized but completely violated by the majority, that the land and the buildings or improvements on it must be valued as a unit and not separately.
Strange and incredible as it may seem, the majority states that it adheres to and reaffirms the general rule as stated in prior decisions of this Court and other authorities, that in eminent domain proceedings buildings or other improvements which constitute a part of the land taken should not be valued separately from the land but must be valued as a unit, and then proceeds erroneously and without any necessity or justification whatsoever to violate the rule completely and to permit the buildings on the easement to be valued separately from the value of the land. I can not subscribe to such fallacious, fruitless, *834 inconsistent and erroneous violation of a rule which it states that it adheres to and reaffirms.
The majority apparently, but unsuccessfully, attempts to justify this almost unbelievable action, and to differentiate it from cases in which the rule has been uniformly recognized and applied, on the ground that only a part of the buildings was located upon the land covered by the easement taken. There is no merit in that position; and there is no difference in law or logic or principle or indeed common sense, between a building which is partly located on the land when, as here, the entire building is taken with the land, and a situation in which the building is located entirely upon the land taken as in the case of The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 619 , 60 S.E.2d 203 .
The majority cites that case and then proceeds to do what that case says may not be done, namely, to permit the value of improvements on the land to be proved and shown separately from the value of the land. In that case, which is controlling with respect to the question here involved of the proof of the value of the land and the building as a unit, this Court, citing numerous well recognized authorities, said: “In condemnation proceedings the value of improvements on the land taken may not be proved or shown separately and apart from the value of the land.”
In Strouds Creek and Muddlety Railroad Company v. Herold, 131 W.Va. 45 , 45 S.E.2d 513 , also cited in the majority opinion but clearly not followed or adhered to in principle, this Court held in Point 8 of the syllabus that: “In a condemnation proceeding to take land which contains coal as to which there has been no severance of title, evidence offered by the landowner of a separate value of the land apart from the coal and of a separate value of the coal is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing the market value of the land.”
In the recent case of Wheeling Electric Company v. Gist, 154 W.Va. 69 , 173 S.E.2d 336 , the opinion contains this *835 language which is here directly applicable: “It has been repeatedly held that the itemizing or listing of the separate value of different elements of property condemned such as the value of minerals, the value of timber and the value of the surface is inadmissible in evidence to prove the market value of the property taken. 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 136 (8); 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 311; Strouds Creek and Muddlety Railroad Company v. Herold, et al., supra; Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Johnson, et al., supra; Chairman of Highway Commission of Virginia v. Fletcher, 153 Va. 43 , 149 S.E. 456 .”
Under the foregoing authorities which the majority says it recognizes but which in fact it disregards, the evidence of the separate value of the buildings which were destroyed or taken in their entirety by the applicant was inadmissible and the action of the majority in holding it to be admissible is clearly erroneous and is completely contrary to and violative of the general rule recognized and applied in the above cited prior decisions of this Court and which is supported by the weight of authority generally. Not only is the holding of the majority violative of and inconsistent with the general rule recognized and applied in such cases, but Points 5 and 6 of the syllabus are in irreconcilable conflict with each other.
Point 5 of the syllabus states without qualification the correct rule, that in the trial of a proceeding in eminent domain when the land taken has been improved by buildings upon it the land and the buildings must be considered as a unit and it is improper to prove separately the value of the land taken and the buildings located on it, whereas Point 6 of the syllabus states that it is not reversible error to permit the land and the buildings to be valued separately in the so-called unusual circumstances in which a portion of a building only, though the entire building is taken with the land, is located on the land. This conflict is not only unnecessary and unwarranted but is also unprecedented. I know of no previous decision of this Court in *836 which it expressly adheres to and reaffirms a general rule and then permits its complete violation.
It is significant that the majority cites no authority, and there is none, to support its position that, as only a portion of the building, which is taken in its entirety is located on the land taken, the general rule which requires the land and the buildings to be valued as a whole and not separately, does not apply.
Instead of according evanescent lip service to the general rule and then departing from it, and instead of creating an unsupported anomaly with respect to the proof of the market value of land improved with buildings, the majority should have followed the holding in The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 619 , 60 S.E.2d 203 , which is exactly in point, is indistinguishable from and is controlling of the decision in this proceeding, and should have held the evidence of the separate value of the buildings inadmissible, and because of the prejudicial error in admitting such evidence, should have reversed the judgment of the circuit court.
The decision of the majority is not only contrary to the prior decisions of this Court but it disregards the doctrine of stare decisis that a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions is generally binding upon the courts and should be followed in similar cases. 21 C.J. S., Courts, Section 187. See Lyon v. Grasselli Chemical Company, 106 W.Va. 518 , 146 S.E. 57 . See also Clarke & Co., v. Figgins, 27 W.Va. 663 . Stare decisis is a salutary rule, is entitled, to1 great weight and ordinarily should be strictly adhered to by the courts especially where a different ruling would work injustice to litigants. 21 C.J.S., Courts, Section 187. In In The Matter of: Proposal to Incorporate the Town of Chesapeake, 130 W.Va. 527 , 45 S.E.2d 113 , this Court, quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary., 3d Ed., said: “The doctrine of stare decisis rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed should be fixed, definite, and known, and that, when the *837 law is declared by court of competent jurisdiction authorized to construe it, such declaration, in absence of palpable mistake or error, is itself evidence of the law until changed by competent authority.”
In my judgment, any unwarranted departure from the doctrine of stare decisis such as the majority has effected by the decision in this proceeding in disregarding though not overruling the decisions in The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, Strouds Creek and Muddlety Railroad Company and Wheeling Electric Company cases, produces conflict, uncertainty and confusion in the reported decisions of this Court on the question involved and such decisions will not be regarded with respect or as reliable authority. At best, the law is a complex system of government and the proper application of its principles in the determination of the questions constantly arising in countless controversies, is fraught with difficulty. For that reason, the Court should strive to attain uniformity in decisions which involve the same or similar questions. This can only be achieved by careful consideration of and adherence to prior decisions in which such questions have been carefully considered and resolved.
Because the ruling of the majority in this proceeding, erroneously holding that the evidence of the separate valuation of the buildings is admissible, violates the general rule and is contrary to the prior decisions of this Court on that question, I would hold such evidence to be inadmissible and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589896. Public record. Not legal advice.