# Mock Ex Rel. Estate of Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

> Supreme Court of South Carolina · June 2, 1955 · 227 S.C. 245

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589257

## Case

- **Full name:** WILLIE H. MOCK, as Administrator of the Estate of Hoyt Leroy Mock, Respondent, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, B. R. TURNER and C. A. NEELY, Appellants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of South Carolina
- **Decided:** June 2, 1955
- **Citations:** 227 S.C. 245; 87 S.E.2d 830; 1955 S.C. LEXIS 34
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Legge
- **Judges:** Baker, Stukes, Taylor, Oxner, Legge
- **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589257

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding $50,000 actual damages plus $15,-000 punitive damages for death of 12-year-old not excessive

## Opinion text

Legge, Justice,
concurring in result.
The verdict in this case was a very large one, but in my opinion not so excessive as to require the conclusion that the learned circuit judge was guilty of abuse of discretion in not for that reason granting a new trial. The unquestioned power of this court thus to strike down the judgment of the lower court has been, and should continue to be exercised only in those rare instances in which the amount of the verdict is so shockingly excessive as manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. Proper application of this power is always difficult, because, as was pointed out in Haselden v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 214 S. C. 410, 53 S. E. (2d) 60 , there is no fixed standard by which the court may ascertain and characterize the excessiveness. In that case it was urged that a verdict in the amount of $45,000.00 for permanent disability of plaintiff’s left foot was so excessive as to show caprice, passion and prejudice; but this court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to grant a new trial on that ground. In the Haselden case, loss of earning capacity was a tangible *267 element in the measure of damages. In Bowers v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 210 S. C. 367, 42 S. E. (2d) 705 , an action for damages for pain suffered by a ten-year-old boy during the period of twenty minutes that elapsed between his injury and death, a verdict of $10,000.00 actual and $10,000.00 punitive damages was sustained by a unanimous court.
In Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 S. C. 123, 138 S. E. 675, 677 , an action for the death of “a young man of high character with excellent prospects for the future,” the published record does not indicate the earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident. There, the father being the sole beneficiary of the cause of action, a verdict of $25,-000.00 actual damages against each of the two corporate defendants was upheld. One of the justices dissented, but on other grounds.
In Hicklin v. Jeff Hunt Machinery Co., S. C., 85 S. E. (2d) 739 , where a verdict for $30,000.00 actual damages was rendered for the wrongful death of a four-year-old child, its amount was not questioned on appeal.
Determination of the propriety of the exercise by this court of its power before mentioned is rendered difficult in an inflated economy, as was pointed out in the Haselden case. It is inherently difficult where, as in the case at bar, there is no tangible factor of damage, such as earning capacity, and the standard of recovery must be measured only by such imponderables as mental anguish, grief and loss of companionship. And its difficulty is emphasized in cases where the evidence has warranted a verdict, in addition to actual, of damages which, though denominated punitive, became part of the plaintiff’s recovery and are thus in fact compensatory. Nor is the problem solved by our arriving at a figure, less than the amount of the verdict, which in our judgment represents the fair measure of recovery, for it is not within our province to substitute that figure for the one found by the jury. That power resides *268 alone in the trial court, as we have repeatedly said, and it would be beside the point to say in the instant case that in our opinion the learned trial judge would have been justified in granting a new trial nisi. We can only affirm the verdict as approved by the lower court, or strike it down in toto. To do the latter we must not only determine for ourselves from the record what part of the amount of the verdict represents, so far as may be expressed in terms of money, the fair measure of the combined elements of plaintiff’s damage, but we must also be convinced that the excess over that figure is the result not of mere undue liberality on the part of the jury, but of passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. I find myself unable to reach that conclusion in the instant case.
Taylor and Oxner, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9589257. Public record. Not legal advice.