# Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles

> California Supreme Court · August 18, 1950 · 35 Cal. 2d 729

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9584354

## Case

- **Full name:** CEDARS OF LEBANON HOSPITAL (A Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Appellants; QUEEN OF ANGELS HOSPITAL (A Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Appellants; THE HOSPITAL OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN (A Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Appellants; MONTE SANO FOUNDATION (A Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Appellants; HUGH K. WALKER Et Al., as Trustees, Etc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Defendants and Appellants; LUTHERAN HOSPITAL SOCIETY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (A Nonprofit Corporation), Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Et Al., Defendants and Appellants
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 18, 1950
- **Citations:** 35 Cal. 2d 729; 221 P.2d 31; 15 A.L.R. 2d 1045; 1950 Cal. LEXIS 375
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Schauer
- **Judges:** Schauer, Shenk, Spence
- **Cited by:** 128 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9584354

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the administration of the affairs of [a hospital] requires that certain personnel and employees be located on or near its grounds to the end that its operation may be efficiently conducted and supervised, and that emergency cases may be effectively handled as they…

## Opinion text

SCHAUER, J.
In concurring I call special attention to the fact that in each of these cases the complaint alleges, and defendants solely for the purposes of their demurrers admit, that the property is not used or operated for profit or to benefit any person in the more advantageous pursuit of his business or profession.
Section 214 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that “Property used exclusively for . . . hospital . . . purposes owned and operated by . . . corporations organized and operated for religious, hospital, scientific, or charitable purposes is exempt from taxation if: . . . (3) The property is not used or operated by the owner or by any other person for profit regardless of the purposes to which the profit is devoted; (4) The property is not used or operated by the owner or by any other person so as to benefit any officer . . . member, employee ... or any other person, through the distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges or compensations or the more advantageous pursuit of their business or' profession.” (Italics added.)
There are no allegations in the complaints which would show that any of the hospitals charges paying patients more per day for the room, board and services furnished those patients than the cost to the hospital of furnishing such room, board and services. If some rooms are intentionally and consistently rented to paying patients at more than cost this operation, in my view, comes within the express language of the above quoted statute (use or operation “for profit regardless of the purposes to which the profit is devoted’’) and, hence, the hospital property so used does not qualify for exemption from taxation.
It is also to be noted that there are no allegations in the complaints here which would show that, with respect to the admission of patients who are charged fees by their doctors, the hospitals selectively admit only the patients of staff doctors. If the hospitals have such an admission policy, it *750 would seem that they are being operated “so as to benefit” the staff doctors in the “more advantageous pursuit of their . . . profession” (Rev. & Tax. Code, §214, par. (4)), and hence, by the express standard set by the Legislature such hospitals would not qualify for the exemption.
It may be noted that a view similar to that which I here express was taken by the trial court in the Monte Sano Foundation case (L. A. 20614), p. 729, with reference to an area in its hospital building which is leased to a physician who uses it exclusively for essential hospital purposes but who is also benefited in his practice by the lease arrangement. The physician, a roentgenologist, furnishes the hospital’s patients with X-ray services and charges them for such services. It would appear that plaintiff Monte Sano agrees with the view that this leased area is being used for “the more advantageous pursuit” of the lessee-doctor’s profession and, therefore, does not come within the tax exemption of section 214, for the plaintiff did not appeal from the portion of the judgment against it, after demurrer sustained without leave to amend, on the cause of action (fourth) involving such leased area.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9584354. Public record. Not legal advice.