# State v. Ringer > Washington Supreme Court · December 29, 1983 · 100 Wash. 2d 686 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9582254 ## Case - **Full name:** The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Russell J. Ringer, Petitioner; The City of Bellevue, Respondent, v. Daniel Eugene Corcoran, Petitioner - **Court:** Washington Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 29, 1983 - **Citations:** 100 Wash. 2d 686; 674 P.2d 1240; 1983 Wash. LEXIS 1922 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Dimmick - **Judges:** Dimmick - **Cited by:** 125 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144 (1986). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9582254 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that "[a] warrantless search [incident to arrest] is permissible only to remove any weapons the arrestee might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is arrested" - recognizing under article I, section 7 “ ‘[the] right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control’ ” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1964)) ## Opinion text Dimmick, J. (dissenting) — Once again we confound the constabulary and, by picking and choosing between state and federal constitutions, change the rules after the game has been played in good faith. I respectfully dissent from these tactics. As the majority's historical treatise points out, for at least 15 years we have interpreted the scope of searches incident to arrest in accordance with federal pronouncements under the Fourth Amendment. Majority opinion, at 697. Compare State v. Larson 93 Wn.2d 638 , 611 P.2d 771 (1980) with State v. Darst, 65 Wn.2d 808 , 399 P.2d 618 (1965). Contrary to the majority's assertion, we have also in *704 effect recognized the "automobile exception," finding war-rantless automobile searches valid under certain circumstances. See State v. Sullivan, 65 Wn.2d 47 , 395 P.2d 745 (1964) (relying on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 69 L. Ed. 543 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)). See also State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971). At about the time that the searches at issue here took place, this court confidently stated that Because of the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle, it is impracticable in many situations to obtain a warrant prior to a vehicle search. In situations of this type, police officers may conduct a warrantless search as long as they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 183 , 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (citing federal precedent). See also State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149 , 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). In the past, we have not clearly distinguished between "automobile exception" search cases and cases involving search of vehicle incident to arrest. In State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974), we held: Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused, or of things under the accused's immediate control, for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to discover and prevent the loss or destruction of evidence of the crime. Since the individuals involved in this case were taken into custody contemporaneously with the search of their vehicle, the search is readily justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest carried out with the reasonable belief that the vehicle was carrying fruits of the crime. (Citations to federal precedent omitted.) Gluck , at 428. We followed the rule that the test for a vehicle search is reasonableness, depending on the facts, circumstances, and *705 exigencies of the situation confronting the police officers. State v. Gibson, 76 Wn.2d 814 , 459 P.2d 22 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970); see also State v. Taylor, 22 Wn. App. 308 , 589 P.2d 1250 , review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1013 (1979). But when the circumstance was lawful arrest from a vehicle, with probable cause to believe the vehicle carried contraband, the warrantless vehicle search was deemed reasonable. State v. Gluck, supra. The rule arises from a commonsense view of the situation facing the police officer. See Texas v. Brown, — U.S. —, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). In general, requiring a warrant at a vehicular arrest is impractical and, more often than not, superfluous. The facts here illustrate the point. No magistrate would deny a warrant to search Ringer's van when presented with a sworn statement that the police officer smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Yet the delay from the time of arrest to the receipt of a warrant could cause "exigencies" that can only be assessed after the fact. Now the majority refuses to find that a contemporaneous search of an arrestee's automobile, with probable cause present, is valid. The majority ignores the practical difficulties that have historically validated automobile searches based on probable cause. It merely holds the search unjustified as a search incident to lawful arrest. Because, although heretofore undiscovered, our state constitution mandates a warrant prior to automobile searches? Or because automobile searches incident to arrest are always unreasonable? But only if the arrestee is handcuffed? Only if the arrestee manages to jump quickly out of the vehicle before the officer approaches it? Should the breadth of one's constitutional protections depend on these distinctions? I fear that the confusion the dissent foresaw in State v. Simpson, supra, has become a reality. The majority disapproves the precedent we have previously required law enforcement officials to heed. Police officers are now told to disregard federal constitutional principles under the cir *706 cumstances this case presents. Predicting the proper course of action for the officer's daily encounters with unexpected situations arising during arrests from vehicles will be precarious. 1 This decision compounds the confusion by throwing into doubt untold number of convictions based on searches made pursuant to the established case law. Moreover, this sudden leap to the sanctuary of our own state constitution affords no real increase in constitutional protection to the defendant. As already noted, prior judicial evaluation of the probable cause in many cases would be only a formality. The warrant could not give the defendant any more protection than was already provided by the probable cause requirement. The officer is thus required to jump through technical hoops with no commensurate furthering of constitutional objectives. I cannot join in a decision that does nothing to clarify either a defendant's rights or a police officer's obligations when arresting a suspect from a vehicle. I therefore dissent. Dore, J., concurs with Dimmick, J. Reconsideration denied February 29, 1984. In State v. Southard, 32 Wn. App. 599 , 648 P.2d 504 (1982), a sheriff's deputy requested a legal opinion from the prosecutor regarding the validity of a warrantless search before attempting to locate a vehicle reportedly carrying hashish. The search was considered valid, apparently on the basis of federal law. Now, an opinion of validity could not be rendered, nor is it clear when a search warrant could or should be issued in a similar situation. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9582254. Public record. Not legal advice.