# State v. Post

> Supreme Court of Minnesota · February 18, 1994 · 512 N.W.2d 99

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580179

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Allen POST, Petitioner, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Minnesota
- **Decided:** February 18, 1994
- **Citations:** 512 N.W.2d 99; 1994 Minn. LEXIS 98; 1994 WL 46954
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Tomljanovich
- **Judges:** Coyne, Tomljanovich
- **Cited by:** 109 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580179

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict” (citation omitted)
- holding that, if a district court erred in admitting evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence "significantly affected the verdict"
- stating that if the district court erred in admitting evidence, the reviewing court determines “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict”
- stating that error is harmless if reviewing court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, even if potential of excluded evidence was fully realized, jury would have reached same verdict
- explaining that district court’s erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if there is no “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict”

## Opinion text

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding a witness’s lay opinion that the victim was the aggressor; therefore, I dissent from that portion of the opinion.
Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn.1980). Clearly the trial judge could have admitted the opinion testimony if he had found that the opinion was rationally based on the perception of the witness and was helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or a determination of a fact in issue. Minn.R.Evid. 701. Rule 701 does not mandate the admission of lay opinion testimony, especially as in this ease where the witness admitted he was drunk, that his view of the incident was partially obstructed, and told the jury that he “can’t recall” some of the actions that night. The trial judge, no doubt, weighed those factors in determining whether the opinion was rationally based on the perception of the witness. The trial judge is in the best position to make that determination; therefore, I dissent in part.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580179. Public record. Not legal advice.