# State v. Brown

> Utah Supreme Court · November 30, 1992 · 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580161

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Donald Wayne BROWN, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** Utah Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 30, 1992
- **Citations:** 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; 853 P.2d 851; 1992 Utah LEXIS 99; 1992 WL 355069
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stewart
- **Judges:** Durham, Stewart, Hall, Howe, Zimmerman
- **Cited by:** 91 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580161

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, pursuant to court's inherent supervisory power over courts, that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons"
- explaining that a party must make a clear and definite objection at trial to preserve an evidentiary challenge for appeal
- explaining why court will not address argument raised for first time in reply brief

## Opinion text

STEWART, Justice,
concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion. I write only because I believe the majority ought not approve the jury instruction that it characterizes as an Allen charge. In my *862 view, the instruction given provides too much leverage to a majority of jurors to exert undue pressure on the minority. This has the potential effect of distorting the deliberative process whereby jurors, through the free exchange of their individual views, reach a consensus through discussion, reason, and argument. Jury instructions should promote the deliberative process by encouraging the discussion of evidence and instructions. That process should not be sacrificed in the interest of reaching a quick group decision.
I recognize that the instruction states that a juror is not to give up a “conscientious conclusion” after reaching such a conclusion. However, the instruction given at the beginning of deliberations weighs too heavily in favor of telling a juror to yield his or her conviction to the majority early on. In short, the instruction reinforces the opinion of the majority more than is appropriate, at least in the beginning of deliberations.
Perhaps it is justifiable to give a true Allen charge after a lengthy trial in which the jury, after full discussion of the evidence over a protracted period, is unable to agree. My fear is that this instruction may have the effect of causing jurors who are initially in a minority to yield their convictions before there is a full airing of the evidence and of each juror’s views.
I do not believe, however, that on the facts of this case, the instruction was prejudicial error.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9580161. Public record. Not legal advice.