# Keel v. Keel

> Supreme Court of Virginia · June 17, 1983 · 225 Va. 606

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9579428

## Case

- **Full name:** Clarence Ward Keel v. Linda L. Keel
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Virginia
- **Decided:** June 17, 1983
- **Citations:** 225 Va. 606; 303 S.E.2d 917; 1983 Va. LEXIS 259
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cochran
- **Judges:** Thomas, Cochran
- **Cited by:** 112 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9579428

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the trial court should consider the broadest range of evidence” so that it may “make a rational comparison between the circumstances of the two parents as those circumstances affect the children”
- holding mother bore burden to show that a change in circumstances adversely affected the best interest of the child and that welfare of the child would have been improved by modification of the initial order
- stating that "the second prong . . . is clearly the most important part of the two-part test"
- applying this standard to petition for change in custody

## Opinion text

COCHRAN, J.,
concurring.
I agree that the decree of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The first question raised on appeal was whether the trial court failed to consider the mother’s adulterous conduct. The trial court expressed disinterest in Linda’s sexual relationships with married men. In Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196 , 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977), on which Clarence relies, we said:
“In all custody cases the controlling consideration is always the child’s welfare and, in determining the best interest of the child, the court must decide by considering all the facts, including what effect a nonmarital relationship by a parent has on the child. The moral climate in which children are to be raised is an important consideration for the court in determining custody, and adultery is a reflection of a mother’s moral values. An illicit relationship to which minor *615 children are exposed cannot be condoned. Such a relationship must necessarily be given the most careful consideration in a custody proceeding.”
218 Va. at 199 , 237 S.E.2d at 91 .
Linda sought to distinguish Brown on the ground that her lovers, unlike the mother’s lover in Brown , did not live in the home and provided less permanent relationships. But it appears from the record that the trial court either failed to follow Brown or to distinguish it.
The trial court also stated that in order to justify a change in custody there must be a finding of “gross conduct that makes it unsafe for the children. . . .” In White v. White, 215 Va. 765 , 213 S.E.2d 766 (1975), on which Clarence relied, we held that even if a mother was not an unfit parent custody could properly be awarded to the father whose home, based “on the warmth and stability of the home environment” rather than any physical disparity, was more suitable. 215 Va. at 768 , 213 S.E.2d at 768 . It was not necessary, therefore to show that Linda was an unfit parent or that her conduct made it “unsafe” for the children to remain with her in order to justify a change of custody to Clarence. It thus appears from the record that the trial court either failed to follow White or to distinguish it.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9579428. Public record. Not legal advice.