# People v. Anderson

> Colorado Court of Appeals · March 11, 1982 · 649 P.2d 720

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9578377

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Lee ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Colorado Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** March 11, 1982
- **Citations:** 649 P.2d 720; 1982 Colo. App. LEXIS 773
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Kelly
- **Judges:** Enoch, Van Cise, Kelly
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9578377

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a defense counsel’s request for a continuance, even without the defendant’s personal consent, extends the speedy trial deadline

## Opinion text

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of § 16-14-104, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).
The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act authorizes an incarcerated defendant to demand and receive a speedy disposition of charges pending against him. The provisions of the Act must, therefore, be interpreted as governing the course of the proceedings as between a defendant and the State, and not between a defendant and his own counsel. Accordingly, § 16-14-104 authorizes a grant of “additional time ... for good cause shown” upon the request of the prosecuting official only. See People v. Swazo, 199 Colo. 486 , 610 P.2d 1072 (1980).
Where, as here, a defendant has personally invoked the application of the Act, it is my view that his counsel’s request for a continuance must be accompanied by the defendant’s written authorization. I do not regard this as an onerous burden in view of the purposes to be served by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act.
For similar reasons, I agree with the defendant’s second contention that the provisions of § 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) and Crim.P. 48 require dismissal of the charges. As the majority states, these statutes are intended to effectuate the constitutional right to a speedy trial. See Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436 , 577 P.2d 3 (1978). I am unable to relegate the right to a speedy trial to a quasi-constitutional status which allows an attorney to effect a waiver of the constitutional right without the defendant’s knowing and intelligent action. Accordingly, again, I would hold that an attorney’s request for a continuance beyond the statutory period requires his client’s written authorization.
Neither can I rule that there has been a waiver here as a result of the defendant’s request for a continuance, there being nothing in the record to show that the defendant knew his actions could constitute a waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. See II ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 12-2.3 (2d ed. 1980).
I am unable to narrow the holdings in Carr v. District Court, 190 Colo. 125 , 543 P.2d 1253 (1975) and Hampton v. District Court, 199 Colo. 104 , 605 P.2d 54 (1980) as the majority has done. I regard both these cases as authority for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to a discharge upon failure of the State to bring him to trial in a timely manner. Moreover, the defendant’s motion for a continuance made on December 10, four days after the speedy trial time had run, does not affect his right to discharge. Muller v. State, 387 So.2d 1037 (Fla.App.1980); see People v. Abeyta, 195 Colo. 338 , 578 P.2d 645 (1978).
I would reverse and discharge the defendant.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9578377. Public record. Not legal advice.