# People v. King > California Supreme Court · May 17, 1993 · 5 Cal. 4th 59 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9575561 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAMMY KING III, Defendant and Appellant - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** May 17, 1993 - **Citations:** 5 Cal. 4th 59; 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233; 93 Daily Journal DAR 6223; 851 P.2d 27; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3635; 1993 Cal. LEXIS 2472 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Mosk - **Judges:** Arabian, Mosk - **Cited by:** 170 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Rayford. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9575561 ## Opinion text MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting. I concur in the judgment to the extent it reverses the Court of Appeal holding that defendant is ineligible for a California Youth Authority commitment and affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal striking the consecutive firearm-use enhancement. I dissent from the decision of the majority to overrule our settled authority in In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] (hereafter Culbreth). In 1976 this court decided Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 . We held that the sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony prescribed by Penal Code section 12022.5 may be imposed only once in the context of multiple counts, “if all the charged offenses are incident to one objective and effectively comprise an indivisible transaction ...” ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 333 .) In overturning this holding, the majority opinion relies in part on criticism of Culbreth expressed by the Court of Appeal in People v. Raby (1986) 179 *82 Cal.App.3d 577 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 576 ]. It should be noted, however, that not only did this court deny a hearing in Raby , but we ourselves cited Culbreth with approval three years after that opinion was filed. (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1103 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ]; see also People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 913-914 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 365 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ]; People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ].) I am at a loss to understand what weighty event has occurred to change this court’s long-standing, consistent view. Culbreth has been the law for 17 years. Our interpretation has been accepted by the Legislature; it has repealed and reenacted Penal Code section 12022.5 once and amended the section nine times in these intervening years, and has never seen fit to abrogate the Culbreth holding. Furthermore, the enactment of other statutes in the intervening time, notably Penal Code sections 1170.1, subdivision (i) and 12022.3, indicate that the Legislature decided to accommodate Culbreth by merely inserting certain limitations to its teaching without abrogating it. This is not a case in which we seek to divine the meaning of legislative silence, as the majority opinion irrelevantly argues, but a clear case for application of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. “ ‘[Wjhen the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the provision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction.’ ” (Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 219 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 733 , 753 P.2d 689 ], quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 640 P.2d 115 , 30 A.L.R.4th 1161 ].) If stare decisis and predictability in the law are to retain any meaning, we should not lightly reject such a long-standing rule. As Justice Cardozo wrote in The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), at page 34: “Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.” We should not overlook the thoughtful discussion of Justice Lewis Powell on three essential merits of the doctrine of stare decisis: “(i) The first is one of special interest to judges: it makes our work easier. As Justice Cardozo put it: ‘[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.’ ... It cannot be suggested seriously that *83 every case brought to the Court should require reexamination on the merits of every relevant precedent, [ft] (ii) Stare decisis also enhances stability in the law. This is especially important in cases involving property rights and commercial transactions. Even in the area of personal rights, stare decisis is necessary to have a predictable set of rules on which citizens may rely in shaping their behavior. [ft| (iii) Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the public and by the other branches of government rests in large part on the knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected judges free to write their policy views into law. Rather, the Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise the judicial power prescribed by the Constitution. An important aspect of this is the respect that the Court shows for its own previous opinions.” (Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. Supreme Ct. Hist. 13.) It must be conceded that there have been rare occasions in our history when human progress required alteration of previous judicial conclusions. Abandonment of the “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483 [ 98 L.Ed. 873 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 ] is a prime example. There have been other exceptional instances in California jurisprudence. But, in general, stability and predictability in the law require that longstanding opinions of this court be respected. Lucas, C. J., and Kennard, J., concurred. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9575561. Public record. Not legal advice.