# Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n

> Supreme Court of Colorado · April 17, 1978 · 195 Colo. 253

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9572427

## Case

- **Full name:** Radiology Professional Corporation, a Colorado Corporation v. Trinidad Area Health Association, Inc., a Colorado Non-Profit Corporation, Stanley H. Biber, Gloria Skufca, Hanns Schwyzer and Guidbaldo Jiminez
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Colorado
- **Decided:** April 17, 1978
- **Citations:** 195 Colo. 253; 577 P.2d 748; 1978 Colo. LEXIS 722
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Carrigan
- **Judges:** Erickson, Carrigan
- **Cited by:** 164 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9572427

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, "[the petitioner cannot recover for the alleged tortious interference with a contract because the agreement was nonexclusive in nature and had not been breached," and omitting discussion of other means of proving intentional interference claim

## Opinion text

MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The contract at issue here contains conflicting clauses which in my view cannot be reconciled without considering parole evidence. After providing that the petitioner is to “furnish to the Hospital all radiology services which it may require during that term of this Agreement,” the contract goes on to state that such services are to include “radiology services to the in or out-patients of the Hospital’s Medical Staff upon request by any member of the Medical Staff.” (Emphasis added.) It is impossible to determine, solely from the contract language, whether the parties *259 intended the contract to be exclusive or subject to each staff doctor’s discretionary choice of radiologists. If, as the majority opinion recognizes, a physician’s right to select professional consultants for his patients may be limited by an exclusive service contract, either construction would be reasonable.
Given this ambiguity in the contract’s language, the trial court properly received extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining the parties’ intent. Ryan v. Fitzpatrick Drilling Co., Inc., 139 Colo. 471 , 342 P.2d 1040 (1959). Determination of that intent in light of the evidence then became a question of fact for the jury. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. City of Aurora, 449 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1971); Halsey v. Darling, 13 Colo. 1 , 21 P. 913 (1889). See also Cosper v. Hancock, 163 Colo. 263 , 430 P.2d 80 (1967). The record clearly reflects that ample evidence was presented to support the jury’s conclusion that an exclusive contract was in fact intended. Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9572427. Public record. Not legal advice.