# Kellogg v. Hoven School District No. 53-2

> South Dakota Supreme Court · December 11, 1991 · 479 N.W.2d 147

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9571654

## Case

- **Full name:** William E. KELLOGG and Gettysburg School District No. 53-1, Appellants and Appellees, v. HOVEN SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 53-2, Respondent and Appellant
- **Court:** South Dakota Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 11, 1991
- **Citations:** 479 N.W.2d 147; 1991 S.D. LEXIS 182; 1991 WL 260502
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Miller
- **Judges:** Sabers, Wuest, Amundson, Miller, Henderson
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9571654

## Opinion text

*153 MILLER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I generally agree with Justice Henderson’s thesis that the trial court and majority have misconstrued or misapplied the settled scope of review in this case. It sets a dangerous precedent and invites improper future ad hoc consideration of appeals in these cases.
This court must and should determine whether the school board, rather than the trial court, was clearly erroneous or abused its discretion. Under our settled law: (1) school boards are legislatively created entities and, thus, are entitled to such consideration under the doctrine of separation of powers, see Strain and Moran cited in the majority and Henderson dissent; (2) deference to school boards is compelled by SDCL 13-8-39, see also Huffman v. Bd. of Ed. of Mobridge Ind. Sch. Dist. Etc., 265 N.W.2d 262, 265-66 (S.D.1978); and (3) a circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law must be restricted to the legality of a school board's decision. Strain, etc.
In making a determination of whether the Board’s decision is supportable under SDCL 1-26-36, the circuit court (and this court on appeal) must ascertain whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision. Moran and Busker v. Board of Ed. of Elk Point, 295 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1980). There is a strong presumption that the Board’s decision was made in good faith. Busker and Moran, supra.
As Justice Henderson’s dissent points out, the trial court did not rule on the legality of the Board’s decision, but rather substituted its judgment consistent with its determination of the most appropriate final result. It is easy to see how this occurred since all natural sympathies lie with the Kelloggs’ position. I personally believe that the Kellogg family belongs in the Gettysburg School District. However, the personal sentiments of judicial officers in these matters are immaterial and should not be considered. (Were I permitted by law to substitute my opinion for that of the Board, I would surely do so in this case— the persuasive writing of the majority opinion clearly articulates many factual reasons justifying the boundary change). I fear that the circuit court and majority have been unable to exercise such judicial restraint. Rather, having concluded that the boundary change should have been allowed, they ignore or sidestep the settled law of this state in favor of a result they prefer.
I, like Justice Henderson, would reverse and remand for reconsideration on the proper scope of review.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9571654. Public record. Not legal advice.