# Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A.

> Supreme Court of North Carolina · August 29, 1990 · 327 N.C. 283

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9566222

## Case

- **Full name:** GLENN W. JOHNSON, Administrator of the Estate of James Wayland Johnson, and BARBARA K. JOHNSON and GLENN W. JOHNSON v. RUARK OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A. (Formerly the Ruark Clinic, P.A.), L. JOSEPH SWAIM, THOMAS B. GREER, WARNER L. HALL and COURTNEY D. EGERTON
- **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 29, 1990
- **Citations:** 327 N.C. 283; 395 S.E.2d 85; 1990 N.C. LEXIS 715
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Webb
- **Judges:** Mitchell, Meyer, Webb
- **Cited by:** 256 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9566222

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “where it is contended that plaintiff’s injuries are too remote as a matter of law, the trial court may be required to decide whether the tortfeasor was legally exempt from foreseeing plaintiff’s injuries in the first place”
- noting that in the context of negligent infliction of emotional distress “the term ‘severe emotional distress’ means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or …
- noting that reasonable foreseeability tests for bystander recovery under NIED “are conscientious efforts to avoid what would otherwise become a tort-feasor’s unlimited liability to any bystander suffering foreseeable serious emotional distress.”
- holding that plaintiff-parents stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress where defendant-doctor caused death of unborn fetus

## Opinion text

Justice WEBB
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority, in order to reach the result it has reached, says it has followed “the overwhelming weight of this Court’s opinions for the past one hundred years.” In applying this “overwhelming weight” of authority the majority has found it necessary to overrule Hinnant v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120 , 126 S.E. 307 (1925), and seven cases decided by the Court of Appeals. I do not believe the Court of Appeals has been wrong in the way it has interpreted our cases.
I believe the cases relied on by the majority show that in some earlier cases we held that negligent infliction of emotional distress without showing more was actionable. These cases involved principally the negligent delivery of telegrams and the negligent burial of bodies. Morrow v. R.R., 213 N.C. 127 , 195 S.E. 383 (1938); Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 370 , 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). As the law developed we held that there must be some impact or physical injury accompanying the negligent act to support a claim. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 ; Williamson *319 v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498 , 112 S.E.2d 48 ; Hinnant v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120 , 126 S.E. 307 ; Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399 , 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Byrd, Recovery For Mental Anguish In North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. Rev. at 457. We have now overruled or disapproved these cases, which I do not think we should do. The rule we have followed is somewhat arbitrary but it is based on the policy that there must be some limit to the liability of a negligent person. I would hold that Glenn W. Johnson and Barbara K. Johnson have not stated claims.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9566222. Public record. Not legal advice.