# Walls v. Commonwealth > Court of Appeals of Virginia · August 5, 1986 · 2 Va. App. 639 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9564043 ## Case - **Full name:** Charles Walls v. Commonwealth of Virginia - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Virginia - **Decided:** August 5, 1986 - **Citations:** 2 Va. App. 639; 3 Va. Law Rep. 205; 347 S.E.2d 175; 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 317 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Benton - **Judges:** Keenan, Benton - **Cited by:** 86 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Abrogated by Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 532 (2004). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9564043 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that consent to search a trailer was fruit of illegal entry, and rejecting claim that police would have inevitably searched the trailer ## Opinion text Benton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent only from that portion of the opinion which holds that on remand the Commonwealth will not be precluded from attempting to establish that Walls’ consent was an intervening act of free will, dissipating the taint of the illegal seizure of the boxes. In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Court stated: [T]he exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). It “extends as well to the indirect as the direct products” of unconstitutional conduct. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. Id. at 804. The locked boxes, including their contents, were discovered and seized by the deputy sheriff after an unconstitutional entry into *660 Walls’ residence and were removed to the sheriffs office. I believe that the boxes and their contents constitute “primary evidence obtained as a direct result” of an illegal entry, an illegal search and an illegal seizure and are “plainly subject to exclusion.” The majority opinion concludes that Fox’s consent to search was invalid. This conclusion means, as the majority so holds, that the search of the trailer and seizure of items found in the search also were unlawful. Walls was shown boxes that were seized illegally as part of the unlawful entry and search and then was requested essentially to ratify and condone all of the earlier unlawful conduct. Segura v. United States indicates that: [T]he question to be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained is “tainted” or is “fruit” of a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence was “ ‘come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” 468 U.S. at 804-05 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). I believe the record before us compels a conclusion that the evidence to which Walls objects was “come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality.” This conclusion necessarily precludes the admission of the contested evidence. Because there was both an illegal entry and illegal search of Walls’ residence while he was detained outside and was aware of the entry and search, certainly there can be no doubt that the request made to Walls at the Sheriffs office to permit the search of the illegally seized boxes was demonstrably an exploitation of the illegal entry and search. The police sought a ratification, several hours after the fact, of the very illegalities they perpetrated under color of law - the illegal entry, illegal search and illegal seizure. The requested consent was an attempt to obtain a benefit from the initial illegal entry and search of the dwelling because the consent which the police sought was for the search of the same items seized during the illegal entry and search of the residence. There is no authority . . . which justifies an . . . illegal search based upon a later consent to an additional search. *661 United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984). The purported consent was derived directly from information gained as a result of the illegal entry, search and seizure. In my opinion, the record fully points to an invasion of Walls’ dwelling by five police officers to obtain evidence of crime with utter disregard for the legality of their conduct. It is this “quality of purposefulness” on an “expedition for evidence” that courts should not condone. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Because “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), this case properly requires application of the exclusionary rule to all evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the violation. I would rule that the trial court should exclude without further inquiry all the evidence seized from the residence during the unconstitutional entry and search. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9564043. Public record. Not legal advice.