# Leandro v. State

> Supreme Court of North Carolina · July 24, 1997 · 346 N.C. 336

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9563601

## Case

- **Full name:** KATHLEEN M. LEANDRO, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem Op Robert A. Leandro; STEVEN R. SUNKEL, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Andrew J. Sunkel; CLARENCE L. PENDER, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Schnika N. Pender; TYRONE T. WILLIAMS, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Trevelyn L. Williams; D.E. LOCKLEAR, JR., Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Jason E. Locklear; ANGUS B. THOMPSON, II, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Vandaliah J. Thompson; JENNIE G. PEARSON, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Sharese D. Pearson; WAYNE TEW, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Natosha L. Tew; DANA HOLTON JENKINS, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Rachel M. Jenkins; FLOYD VICK, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Ervin D. Vick; HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; HALIFAX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; ROBESON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; VANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiffs, AND CASSANDRA INGRAM, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Darris Ingram; CAROL PENLAND, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Jeremy Penland; DARLENE HARRIS, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Shamek Harris; NETTIE THOMPSON, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Annette Renee Thompson; DAVID MARTINEZ, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Daniela Martinez; OPHELIA AIKEN, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of Brandon Bell; ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION; DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WINSTON SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Intervenors v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 24, 1997
- **Citations:** 346 N.C. 336; 488 S.E.2d 249; 1997 N.C. LEXIS 486
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Orr
- **Judges:** Mitchell, Orr
- **Cited by:** 97 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9563601

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the North Carolina Constitution's provisions, "The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right," N.C. Const. art. I, § 15, and, "The General Assembly shall provide ... for a general and uniform sys…
- stating that if, on remand, the trial court finds a violation “it will then be the duty of the court to enter a judgment granting declaratory relief and such other relief as needed to correct the wrong while minimizing the encroachment on the other branches of government”
- concluding that plaintiffs’ educational adequacy claims are not nonjusticiable political questions and that “it is the duty of this Court to address [their] constitutional challenge to the state’s public education system.”
- holding that claims against the City of Creedmoor police chief and a member of the City of Creedmoor Board of Commissioners in their official capacities were merely another way of bringing suit against the City of Creedmoor
- stating that standardized achievement tests are one factor the trial court should consider in determining whether any of the state’s children are being denied the opportunity for a sound basic education

## Opinion text

Justice Orr
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds that the alleged disparity in the educational opportunities offered by different school districts in this state does not violate Article IX, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. I believe, for the reasons stated below, that if the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint are proven at trial, then the state’s funding plan for public education would violate the “equal opportunities” clause set forth in our Constitution.
The majority advances two arguments in support of its ruling upholding the current method of state funding for the public school system. The first is that “Article IX, Section 2(2) of our Constitution expressly authorizes the General Assembly to require that local governments bear part of the costs of their local public schools.” Second, the majority points out that, historically, local governments have played a significant role in funding our public school system. All of this is true.
However, the majority also views the role of local government as somehow reducing or eliminating the state’s ultimate responsibility for funding our public schools. Thus, according to the majority logic, the unequal funding brought about by this system must have been anticipated by the framers of our Constitution. Therefore, no equal treatment in educational opportunities was ever intended. I disagree. The framers of our Constitution also provided, “The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 15 (emphasis added). The Constitution further provides that the General Assembly shall “provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1) (emphasis added). It must be noted that in both of these constitutional provisions, the burden and responsibility is placed upon the state and the General Assembly. Nowhere is the constitutional responsibility for public education placed on local governments. In fact, the counties of North Carolina were created by the General Assembly as governmen *359 tal agencies of the state. N.C. Const, art. VII, § 1. Counties are merely regarded as
“agencies of the State for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State’s territory, and in the exercise of ordinary governmental functions they are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, except when restricted by constitutional provision”....
Town of Saluda v. Polk County, 207 N.C. 180, 183 , 176 S.E. 298, 300 (1934) (quoting Jones v. Commissioners, 137 N.C. 579, 596 , 50 S.E. 291, 297 (1905)).
The reliance by the majority on the language in Article IX, Section 2(2) of our Constitution that declares the General Assembly “may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as they may deem appropriate” (emphasis added) can in no way reduce the state’s ultimate responsibility. Nor can the simple fact that local governments may use local revenue to “add or supplement” public school programs allow the state to avoid its constitutionally mandated obligation to “provide for a general and uniform system of free public schools.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1).
Moreover, the majority contends that because local funding has been utilized throughout our state’s history, any disparities in funding must have been anticipated by the framers of our Constitution. This argument cannot be maintained. I agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s characterization of this reasoning as a “ ‘cruel illusion.’ ” See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 155 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 761 , 557 P.2d 929, 948 , 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 364 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 , 53 L. Ed. 2d 1079 (1977)). Local education funds are primarily generated through property taxes. If a county has a relatively low total assessed value of property, it has a barrier beyond which it cannot go in funding its educational system(s). Although these counties might impose a higher tax rate than their wealthier counterparts, their efforts cannot substitute for a lack of resources. The poorer counties simply cannot tax themselves to a level of educational quality that its tax base cannot supply. In those circumstances, the argument for local funding is a “cruel illusion” for those officials and citizens who are interested in a quality education for their children.
Although the majority opinion acknowledges the 1970 constitutional amendment to Article IX, Section 2(1) that added the phrase *360 “wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students,” the majority apparently gives no significance to its meaning. Defendants, in their brief, contend that the phrase was adopted for the sole purpose of addressing racial segregation. Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282 , 357 S.E.2d 432 , disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790 , 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987). I disagree and believe that the majority fails to give this constitutional mandate the full scope of its meaning.
Contrary to the rationale presented in Britt , the 1971 constitutional framers removed existing language from the 1877 Constitution which mandated that “the children of the white race and the children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice of, either race.” N.C. Const, of 1877, art. IX, § 2 (1969). The framers did not choose simply to remove the initial racially discriminatory language, but instead rewrote the constitutional language to provide for “equal opportunities . . .for all students." N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1) (emphasis added).
In arguing the phrase applies only to racial issues, the Britt court essentially violated a rule of statutory interpretation: “ ‘[W]here the meaning is clear from the words used,’ ” courts should not search for a meaning elsewhere but rather should give meaning to the plain language of the constitution. Martin v. North Carolina, 330 N.C. 412, 416 , 410 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991) (quoting State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449 , 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989)). To interpret the phrase “equal opportunities . . . for all students” as equal opportunities for only minority students creates a restrictive definition that the framers could not have intended. Indeed, in regard to education, our Constitution displays a deep concern for “ ‘ensuring] every child a fair and full 'opportunity to reach his full potential.’ ” Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 618 , 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 115-1.1 (1978)) (recodified as N.C.G.S. § 115C-106 (1994)) (explaining the force of N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1) and N.C. Const, art. I, § 15). The Constitution, by its literal reading, means all students. It does not discriminate as to race, gender, handicap, economic status, or geography. Thus, students residing in a poorer district are still entitled to substantially equal educational opportunities as students in wealthier districts.
The majority also advances the rationale that plaintiffs’ argument for equal educational programs and resources is not practical. This *361 justification is based on the notion that identical funding and programs are unattainable. However, I believe that the phrase “equal educational opportunities,” as advanced by plaintiffs, encompasses more than identical programs and funding for all the school districts in oúr state. The concept also addresses access to new textbooks, adequate facilities, other educational resources, and quality teachers with competitive salaries. The majority primarily focuses on the word “equal,” interpreting this to mean “identical,” and rejects the concept because of the fear of never-ending litigation. However, plaintiffs, in their brief, characterize equality as follows:
[T]he concept of equality is never absolute. When used in the context of human relations, the notion of equality must take [into] account the fact that no two people and no two situations are in all respects exactly alike. We use the word equality to express a range within which things can and should be similar.
See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 652 , 376 A.2d 359, 375 (1977). Plaintiffs are essentially arguing that while perfect equality can never be achieved, much can be done to provide substantially equal opportunities. This description is consistent with Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “equality” as “[t]he condition of possessing substantially the same rights, privileges, and immunities.” Black’s Law Dictionary 536 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Thus, the phrase “equal opportunities,” in practical terms, means substantially equal opportunities.
Therefore, the equality plaintiffs seek is not necessarily absolute and identical but, rather, is substantial equality. Although the concept of substantial equality is difficult to define, it is clear that a gross disparity in resources does not fall within its definition. For example, plaintiffs allege that many of their schools lack adequate classroom space and that they are forced to hold classes in hallways, cafeterias, libraries, and closets. Plaintiffs also argue that students in Wake County have science laboratories to conduct biology experiments; however, children in Hoke County must watch videos of others conducting the experiment because of lack of resources. Plaintiffs also point to several less obvious disparities: lack of sewer connections and problematic waste water disposal, leaking roofs that cause extensive damage and sometimes require classrooms to be closed during heavy rains, and lighting systems and acoustics that are often poor and inadequate. Plaintiffs also allege that higher teacher pay supplements in the wealthier counties make it more difficult for them *362 to attract the best teachers to their schools. The result of the above inadequacies is that in basic courses such as math, history, and English, more than 80% of the students in plaintiffs’ counties are failing. If these allegations are true, these students may not even be receiving the sound basic education that the majority mandates. It also reflects the fact that there is a wide disparity between the wealthier and poorer counties. Can it be rationally argued that students from economically disadvantaged school districts with outdated texts, aging buildings, limited resources, and teachers at the lower end of the wage scale are receiving substantially equal educational opportunities with those students from well-financed school districts with state-of-the-art facilities? The answer is as obvious as is the constitutional mandate that there be “equal opportunities . . . for all students.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1).
The notion of substantial equality in educational opportunities for all students is not a novel concept. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545 , 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 . Even our constitutional framers addressed this issue. They commented that the Constitution was designed to “level upwards, to every child, as far as the State can, an opportunity to develop to the fullest extent, all his intellectual gifts. So noble an effort, needs no vindication.” Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of North Carolina 487 (1868) (emphasis added). Three years later, this Court pronounced in Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153 (1871), that Article IX provides that the state public school system
will be observed as a “system”; it is to be “general,” and it is to be “uniform.” It is not subject to the caprice of localities, but every locality, yea every child, is to have the same advantage ....
[Otherwise,] [i]n some townships there would be no schools, in others inferior ones, and in others extravagant ones, to the oppression of the taxpayers. There would be no “uniformity” and but little usefulness, and the great aim of the government in giving all of its citizens a good education would be defeated.
Id. at 157-58 (emphasis added). In essence, I believe that our constitutional framers intended for all students to have equal access to public schools and substantially equal educational opportunities. To conclude otherwise would create arbitrary boundaries on educa *363 tional opportunities based on geographical lines and local funding circumstances.
In evaluating plaintiffs’ claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts alleged are to be taken as true, Embree Const. Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 490 , 411 S.E.2d 916, 919-20 (1992), and a complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim,” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 103 , 176 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1970). In our case, statistics employed by both plaintiffs and the state show, for example, that for the 1990-91 fiscal year, the funding for operation of the state’s public school system came from the following sources: state funds (66.1%), local funds (24.5%), federal funds (6.6%), and private funds (2.8%). National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Digest of Education Statistics, tbl. 157, at 152 (1993). For capital outlay expenditures, the allocation was as follows: state funds (9%), local funds (90%), and federal funds (1%). Public Schools of N.C., State Bd. of Educ., N.C. Public Schools Statistical Profile, tbl. 30, at 58 (1993) (citing 1991-92 fiscal year statistics). These statistics show without question that a sizeable portion of funding, particularly in the area of capital outlays, falls upon local governments. Consequently, wealthier counties are more capable of meeting their educational needs than are economically disadvantaged counties. These allegations, if true, are more than adequate to state a claim under both the right to a sound basic education and the right to a substantially equal opportunity to get the best education possible.
By the above discussion, I do not contend that the state must necessarily assume complete control over educational allocations. The General Assembly still has the discretion to allocate this responsibility between the state and local governments. Yet it must be reemphasized that the inability or indifference of local governments to provide funds does not excuse the General Assembly from a duty specifically imposed on it by the Constitution.
In closing, we should reflect upon the history of education in North Carolina. The control over education has often been fraught with political overtones of class, race, and gender. In the early 1900s, the New South movement led a classroom revolution to reform the existing education system. Since that turning point, reformers have espoused a platform of simple justice and equality in an effort to ensure a quality education for all children. See generally James L. *364 LeLoudis, Schooling the New South (1996). This process has been long and arduous. As Robert Ogden, a leading reformer in the early 1900s, explained: “[T]he work must be thorough-going, because we wish gradually to change ... an outworn system of society.” Id. at 146 .
The essential issue in this debate concerns substantial equality of educational opportunities. The issue is not, as the majority argues, simply equality of funding. It is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly to formulate and implement the North Carolina public education system. The state’s ultimate responsibility for education under the Constitution cannot be delegated. The specific duties implementing the responsibility are assignable, but the responsibility per se is not. Therefore, any assignment of authority to local governments fails to relieve the state of its responsibility to provide substantially equal educational opportunities to all students. I believe the majority erred in holding that the North Carolina Constitution does not entitle students in all school districts to substantially equal educational opportunities. In this case, plaintiffs have alleged substantial disparities in educational opportunities between wealthier and poorer counties based upon the state’s funding system. These are sufficient allegations to state a claim and, if proven true, would entitle plaintiffs to relief.
Because I am unable to join the majority’s decision regarding the issue of equal opportunities, I respectfully dissent in part as to this and related issues. I concur, however, with the analysis and results reached by the majority in the remainder of the opinion that does not deal with substantially equal educational opportunities.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9563601. Public record. Not legal advice.