# Butt v. State of California

> California Supreme Court · December 31, 1992 · 4 Cal. 4th 668

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9561440

## Case

- **Full name:** THOMAS K. BUTT Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Et Al., Defendants and Appellants
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 31, 1992
- **Citations:** 4 Cal. 4th 668; 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480; 93 Daily Journal DAR 152; 842 P.2d 1240; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 39; 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6139
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Mosk
- **Judges:** Baxter, Lucas, Mosk, Kennard
- **Cited by:** 185 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9561440

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes . . . the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Co…
- stating that while ''[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes ... the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Con…
- stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes ... the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Cons…

## Opinion text

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion.
However, I cannot embrace the ill-advised concession that the trial court’s order “did pose a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative branch” although the degree of potential disruption “is not great” and the purported infringement on the legislative function is “not substantial.” (Kennard, J., post, conc, and dis. opn. at pp. 710, 711.)
The theory of potential interference with legislative functions to any extent is inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion that the funds used for the emergency loan were “reasonably related” to the educational purposes of the legislation, and, indeed, “the trial court’s order furthered, rather than defeated, that valid legislative purpose.” As persuasively observed in footnote 2, the “funds were appropriated for purposes reasonably and closely related *706 to the purpose for which the trial court ordered them to be used.” (Kennard, J., post, conc. and dis. opn. at p. 711.)
Under the foregoing circumstances—with which I agree—there cannot be some conceptual interference, even though “not great,” with the functions of the legislative branch.
With that caveat, I join the concurring and dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9561440. Public record. Not legal advice.