# Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

> California Supreme Court · December 27, 1993 · 6 Cal. 4th 965

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9560392

## Case

- **Full name:** FRANK POTTER Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 27, 1993
- **Citations:** 6 Cal. 4th 965; 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550; 93 Daily Journal DAR 16566; 863 P.2d 795; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9695; 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6375
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Mosk
- **Judges:** Baxter, Mosk, Kennard, George
- **Cited by:** 474 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Declined to follow by Boryla v. Pash, 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3040 (1998).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 1
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9560392

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the cost of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable medical expert testimony, that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure and that the recommend…
- holding that a defendant’s conduct creating the need for future medical monitoring “does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery.”
- holding that landowners' reasonably certain need for medical monitoring as a result of their exposure to toxic wastes from a neighboring landfill is an item of damage for which compensation may be allowed
- holding "that recovery of medical monitoring damages should not be dependent upon a showing that a particular cancer or disease is reasonably certain to occur in the future"

## Opinion text

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent it recognizes a cause of action in negligence for causing fear of cancer in the absence of a claim of physical injury or disease. I also concur in the majority opinion’s treatment of Firestone’s comparative fault claim, and I concur in the opinion to the extent it reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the cause of action for medical monitoring costs.
I disagree with the majority in two respects. First, I agree with Justice George’s contention that when a defendant negligently exposes a plaintiff to carcinogenic toxins, plaintiff’s recovery for resulting fear of cancer should not depend on proof that it is probable the cancer will actually occur. As Justice George demonstrates, under settled tort principles, proof of the emotional damage flowing from defendant’s negligent act should not depend on proof of the probable occurrence of the disease.
*1013 I also agree with Justice Kennard that the majority err in creating an anomalous new cause of action in negligence requiring proof of malicious conduct. When it is shown that the defendant has acted with conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s health and safety in exposing the plaintiff to carcinogenic toxins, the plaintiff may state a claim for an intentional tort. I write separately, however, because I am convinced this case readily fits the rubric of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal on this cause of action without remand for retrial.
We recently restated the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. They are: “(i) outrageous conduct by defendant, (ii) an intention by defendant to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (iii) severe emotional distress, and (iv) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 300 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 763 P.2d 948 ], italics added; see also Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 , 820 P.2d 181 ] [Christensen].) Furthermore, the defendant “must have engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ ” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903 , quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 210 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ].)
This case falls into the category of “reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress.” As the Court of Appeal observed, the defendants knew that the wastes they deposited at the Crazy Horse dump would pose a health hazard to anyone near the dump. The defendants were aware that it was prohibited to dump toxic waste at the Crazy Horse dump because of the danger such waste would leach into and contaminate the groundwater. They agreed not to dump toxic wastes at the dump, but, knowing of the danger to users of the local water supply, they nevertheless intentionally dumped carcinogenic toxic waste there. Thus defendants created a probability that once their illegal and ultrahazardous conduct was discovered, it would cause emotional distress to those who used the local water supply. It seems clear that this conduct meets the definition of reckless conduct in the context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The majority, however, relying on this court’s misguided discussion in Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903-904 , would require plaintiffs in toxic exposure cases to show that the reckless defendant directed his or her conduct at the plaintiffs in particular, knowing of their individual presence in harm’s way. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1001-1003.)
*1014 It is inconsistent with the definition of recklessness to require that the defendant direct his or her conduct at, or be aware of, particular plaintiffs. By definition, a reckless person acts in culpable disregard of the results of his or her conduct. In this state, “[a] defendant’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress if [he] [she] has knowledge of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will result and acts with deliberate disregard of that probability or with a conscious disregard of the probable results.” (BAJI No. 12.77 (1992 re-rev.) (7th ed. pocket pt.) p. 27; see Spackman v. Good (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 518, 530 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 78 ]; see also Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 210 ; Ledger v. Tippitt (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 625, 642 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 814 ].)
The Restatement Second of Torts explains that intentional infliction of emotional distress may be actionable when defendant’s conduct is reckless: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress . . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46.) A comment to this section explains: “The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It applies also where he acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.” (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 46, com. i, p. 77, italics added.)
Section 500 defines reckless disregard of the safety of others as: “The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 500.) Although the culpable act must be intentional, “the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result. . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 500, com. f, p. 590, italics added.)
Most significantly, the Restatement would not require that the actor be aware that any particular person is in the zone of danger caused by the culpable act: “If the actor’s conduct is such as to involve a high degree of risk that serious harm will result from it to anyone who is within range of its effect, the fact that he knows or has reason to know that others are within such range is conclusive of the recklessness of his conduct toward them. It is *1015 not, however, necessary that the actor know that there is anyone within the area made dangerous by his conduct. It is enough that he knows that there is strong probability that others may rightfully come within such zone.” (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 500, com. d, p. 589, italics added.)
Under these standards, there should be no requirement that plaintiffs show that defendants were aware of their individual existence or that defendants directed their hazardous conduct against identifiable persons in particular. Defendants should have realized the probability that their hazardous conduct would cause emotional distress, and they must be charged with knowledge that there was a strong probability that others would come within the zone of danger of their conduct. They knew the reason that their conduct was prohibited was to protect all persons who lived near the dump.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal with respect to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9560392. Public record. Not legal advice.
