# Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Oklahoma · November 30, 1993 · 64 O.B.A.J. 3587

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559870

## Case

- **Full name:** Tim JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCY HEALTH CENTER, INC., Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Oklahoma
- **Decided:** November 30, 1993
- **Citations:** 64 O.B.A.J. 3587; 864 P.2d 839; 1993 OK 155; 1993 Okla. LEXIS 179; 1993 WL 492392
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Summers
- **Judges:** Opala, Hodges, Lavender, Simms, Hargrave, Watt, Wilson, Summers
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559870

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that hospital is covered by Good Samaritan law when it gives emergency treatment to a visitor but not a patient
- holding that statutory good Samaritan immunity applied because invitee/visitor was not patient

## Opinion text

SUMMERS, Justice,
dissenting:
The Court of Appeals held the Good Samaritan statute inapplicable as a matter of law. This Court goes to the other extreme and applies the statute as a matter of law. Under the facts of this case I would let the jury decide, and here is why.
A demurrer was sustained at the close of plaintiffs presentation of evidence. The test of a demurrer to’ plaintiffs evidence requires the trial court to “accept as true all of the plaintiff’s evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom while disregarding conflicting evidence favorable to the defendant.” Blood v. R & R Engineering Inc., 769 P.2d 144, 145 (Okla.1989). A demurrer should not be sustained unless there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. Downing v. First Bank in Claremore, 756 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Okla.1988). Every fact favorable to the plaintiff, together with all reasonable inferences, is admitted as true when considering a demurrer. Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 262 (Okla.1982).
The Good Samaritan statute protects a health-care provider who volunteers help “under emergency circumstances that suggest the giving of aid is the only alternative to probable death or serious bodily injury.” 76 O.S.1991 § 5(a)(1) (emphasis mine). A bright-line rule as to just when an emergency occurs is not feasible, according to Breazeal v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem. Hosp., 234 Cal.App.3d 1329 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 207, 213 (1991):
An emergency within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statutes exists when there is an urgent medical circumstance of so pressing a character that some kind of action must be taken ... It would seem obvious that in determining whether a patient’s condition constitutes such an emergency the trier of fact must consider the gravity, the certainty, and the immediacy of the consequences to be expected if no action is taken. However, beyond observing that these are the relevant considerations, the variety of situations that would qualify as emergencies under any reasonable set of criteria is too great to admit of anything approaching a bright line rule as to just how grave, how certain, and how immediate such consequences have to be. (Citations omitted).
The standard for considering a demurrer requires us to look at all the evidence favorable to Plaintiff to see if there is an entire absence of proof which would allow recovery. Plaintiff presented evidence by the testimony of a nurse, which if taken as true, would support a finding that there was not an emergency. 1 Moreover, Plaintiff was not required to prove the negative of those elements required by the statute. Rather, the Good Samaritan statute is a defense to the claim, the applicability of which must be shown by the hospital. See West Nichols Hills Presbyterian Church v. Folks, 276 P.2d 255, 259 (Okla.1954). The hospital, if allowed to present its evidence, would likely be able to offer testimony that the situation was of an emergency nature, and that the statute should afford protection. All 50 states have some form of a Good Samaritan statute, and there is ample authority that its applicability as to whether an emergency existed or not may be a question of fact for the jury. Eoff v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Foundation, 811 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Tex.Ct.App.1991); Markman v. Kotler, 52 A.D.2d 579 , 382 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523 (N.Y.App.Div.1976).
There is a reason unique to this case for letting a jury decide if there was an emergency. Webster defines emergency as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (emphasis mine). The ma *847 jority today by declaring an emergency as a matter of law has pronounced the young husband’s fainting spell unforeseeable! Would it be preposterous for a factfinder to conclude that indeed a fair percentage of men will predictably become light-headed while observing their mate give birth by way of caesarean? If a man is in that room at the hospital’s invitation, does not the hospital possibly have some duty to foresee a fainting spell, and to render appropriate care if it occurs? I believe these are issues that could and should be sorted out by a jury. Therefore I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice KAUGER joins in these views.
. Nurse Botite testified that just because one gets lightheaded it does not mean he is going to pass out.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559870. Public record. Not legal advice.