# Rich v. Cooper

> Oregon Supreme Court · April 10, 1963 · 234 Or. 300

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559450

## Case

- **Full name:** Rich v. Cooper
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 10, 1963
- **Citations:** 234 Or. 300; 380 P.2d 613; 1963 Ore. LEXIS 403
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Penny
- **Judges:** Penny, McAllister, Perry, O'Connell, Goodwin, Lusk
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559450

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that demonstrative exhibits can be admissible when they are “not materially different” from the objects in question

## Opinion text

PENNY, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I cannot agree with their statement that “If plaintiff had offered in evidence a sap of exactly the same type as that used by defendant, the trial court would have erred in excluding it under the circumstances existing in the present case.”
Duplicates of originals may be used when it appears to be necessary to properly describe some article which is “rare and difficult to describe,” or where the nature and properties of an article itself require consideration by a jury, or where, as with models, the model tends to explain how an event may have occurred. Murray v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 121 Or 165 , 254 P 817 ; Perringer v. Lynn Food Co., (Mo App 1941) 148 SW2d 601 ; See also, 32 CJS 456, 457, Evidence, §§ 605-6, pp 456, 457.
Prom what has just been stated, then, the trial court’s discretion in permitting or denying the admission of duplicates also lies in determining whether or not such duplicates will materially aid a jury in its determination of the facts relevant to the issues presented. Thus, if an article is simple of description so that a person of ordinary understanding would have no difficulty in understanding the qualities of such article by oral description, it cannot be said a court has abused its discretion in refusing the admission of a duplicate article offered.
In my opinion, any person of ordinary understanding would comprehend the nature of a “sap” from an oral description. Therefore, this court ought not to *314 invade the province of the trial conrt and determine as a matter of law that in all instances the trial court must admit exact duplicates unless they “may produce undue prejudice, confuse the jury, or if for some other specific policy reason the harm which might result from its reception may outweigh the probative value of the evidence.”
Mr. Justice Lusk joins in this specially concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9559450. Public record. Not legal advice.