# State v. Jenkins

> Hawaii Supreme Court · April 6, 2000 · 93 Haw. 87

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9558445

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne Thomas JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Hawaii Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 6, 2000
- **Citations:** 93 Haw. 87; 997 P.2d 13; 2000 Haw. LEXIS 97
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Watanabe
- **Judges:** Moon, Levinson, Nakayama, Ramil, Intermediate, Watanabe
- **Cited by:** 177 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9558445

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that whether the defendant did or did not possess a hunting license was a fact peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge, and therefore, the statutory exception to the “place to keep” offense pertaining to individuals with a hunting license constituted a defense
- finding that a warrant-less seizure was reasonable where officer thought he was in danger because the passengers in a pulled over vehicle exhibited an unusual degree of movement and refused to obey the officer’s orders to remain in the vehicle
- explaining that in reviewing a motion to suppress, "the credibility of witnesses falls within the province of the trier of fact, and should not be second-guessed by this court" (internal citation omitted)
- holding that proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct is sufficient to prove defendant's state of mind
- stating that a warrantless search may be justified based upon the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances

## Opinion text

Opinion by
WATANABE, J.,
Dissenting in part and Concurring in part.
I have grave concerns about the majority’s overruling of State v. Auwae, 89 Hawai'i 59 , 968 P.2d 1070 (App.1998), and State v. Mundell, 8 Haw.App. 610 , 822 P.2d 23 (1991), and the establishment by the majority of a new “two-pronged analysis” for determining whether a felon is in “possession” of a firearm. I believe that the new test adopted by the majority will lead to confusion, especially in cases such as this one, which involves constructive, as opposed to actual, possession. Moreover, since it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that “where there is a ‘plainly irreconcilable’ conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific will be favored,” Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 55 , 868 P.2d 1193, 1202 , I believe that the more specific requirement in Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-202 (1993) that possession must be “knowing” must trump the more general default scienter requirement set forth in HRS § 702-204 (1993).
Additionally, although the issue has not been raised on appeal, I am troubled by whether double jeopardy principles allow Jenkins to be convicted and punished for both being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition and failing to confine a firearm or ammunition to his “place of business, residence, or sojourn.” The majority states that “it is a material element of place to keep pistol or revolver that the firearm at issue be away from the possessor’s ‘place of business, residence, or sojourn.’ ” Majority Opinion at 108, 997 P.2d at 34. Therefore, according to the majority, the jury must be instructed that it is the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Jenkins possessed or carried firearms away from his ‘place of business, residence, or sojourn.’ ” Id. at 109, 997 P.2d at 35. However, as a convicted felon, Jenkins was not allowed to possess any firearm or ammunition at any time or place. Therefore, I believe that a serious double jeopardy issue is presented if Jenkins is convicted and sentenced for violating both HRS § 134—7(b) and HRS § 134-6(c), based on the same conduct of possessing a firearm or ammunition. I believe this issue should be briefed and addressed on remand.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9558445. Public record. Not legal advice.