# State v. Coria > Washington Supreme Court · November 12, 1992 · 120 Wash. 2d 156 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9553466 ## Case - **Full name:** The State of Washington, Petitioner, v. Otoniel Leyve Coria, Et Al, Respondents - **Court:** Washington Supreme Court - **Decided:** November 12, 1992 - **Citations:** 120 Wash. 2d 156; 839 P.2d 890; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 271 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Durham - **Judges:** Guy, Durham - **Cited by:** 208 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9553466 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that state objective of keeping drug dealers away from school children is a legitimate state objective - rejecting intermediate scrutiny when physical liberty interest is involved, but no semisuspect class is affected ## Opinion text Durham, J. (dissenting) — Due process requires that statutes "provide fair notice, measured by common practice and understanding, of that conduct which is prohibited". State v. Brayman, 110 Wn.2d 183, 196 , 751 P.2d 294 (1988) (quoting State v. Carter, 89 Wn.2d 236, 239-40 , 570 P.2d 1218 (1977)). Nonetheless, RCW 69.50.435 substantially increases criminal penalties for selling drugs in particular "zones" 5 which are not visible or otherwise identifiable. Accordingly, I would agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute is uncon *176 stitutionally vague and would reverse the enhanced sentences. Tb briefly restate the facts, most school bus stops in the Yakima School District are a "now you see it, now you don't" occurrence. They are not marked in any visible manner and are discernible only by the presence of the school bus while it is loading or unloading. The locations change from time to time depending on the needs of the students, the weather, and other factors. A list indicating the locations of stops is published in the local newspaper every fall, but it is not considered official for purposes of the enhanced penalty statute. Testimony from the Yakima School District's director of transportation revealed that only one official bus stop map exists, of which no copies are made. This map is extremely difficult to read and it is not updated during the school year even though changes are commonplace. The map is sometimes in transit to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The majority contends that fair notice does not require knowledge that one is dealing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. It relies upon federal and state cases which uphold enhanced penalties for selling drugs near school yards, playgrounds, youth centers and swimming pools. Majority, at 165. As the majority points out, these cases hold that mens rea, or knowledge that one is in close proximity to a school, need not be shown in order to enhance a sentence. However, these cases all deal with activity surrounding a visible structure, not an unmarked location. In this regard, the Washington statute is unique. No other jurisdiction enhances punishments for selling drugs near a location that is not visible. None of the cases cited by the majority address the particular problem posed by the Washington statute. The majority also relies on the fact that the statute in question, RCW 69.50.435, has no mens rea requirement. However, this does not go to the issue of fair notice under the due process clause of the constitution. When enhanced penalties are tied to marked locations like schools and playgrounds, individuals have the ability to determine if they *177 face increased criminal liability. See United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1985). No such opportunity exists under our statute. The majority's suggestion that a drug dealer can simply call school authorities and ask for the location of stops is silly. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, "[i]f the arresting officer cannot ascertain the distance at the time of arrest, it is unreasonable to expect a particular defendant to have knowledge at the time of the sale." State v. Coria, 62 Wn. App. 44, 50 , 813 P.2d 584 (1991). Although the majority was unable to cite any authority addressing the specific problem posed by RCW 69.50.435, there is at least one federal case on point. In United States v. Coates, 739 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), defendants were accused of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. At the time of the arrest, the defendants were on a train bound for Maryland and the school was within 1,000 feet of the train station. In holding the schoolhouse statute to be inapplicable, the District Court stated that: To charge a schoolyard count in these circumstances stretches the scope of the statute beyond logical and acceptable bounds. The statute cannot be meant to reach the circumstance of Coates' and Dillard's presence, undoubtedly unknowingly, within a 1,000 feet of a school while ensconced in a railway car. To posit liability under [21 U.S.C.] § 845a in these fortuitous circumstances is simple overreaching. (Italics mine.) Coates, 739 F. Supp. at 153 . Similarly, the due process requirement of fair notice does not allow the State to enhance penalties for selling drugs near unmarked and largely unidentifiable locations like school bus stops. Enhancing drug penalties is within the Legislature's prerogative, but it must do so in a manner that comports with due process. Smith and Johnson, JJ., concur with Durham, J. The statute enhances penalties for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of school bus route stops or school grounds. RCW 69.50.435(a). The validity of an enhanced penalty for offenses committed near school grounds is not at issue in these appeals. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9553466. Public record. Not legal advice.