# Brown v. Multnomah County District Court

> Oregon Supreme Court · October 12, 1977 · 280 Or. 95

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9552450

## Case

- **Full name:** BROWN, Petitioner, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT Et Al, Respondents
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 12, 1977
- **Citations:** 280 Or. 95; 570 P.2d 52; 1977 Ore. LEXIS 653
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Tongue
- **Judges:** Linde, Tongue, Holman
- **Cited by:** 166 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9552450

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the “guarantee [of] proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is “required by due process under the federal 14th amendment not only in criminal prosecutions but in other proceedings of similar character”
- holding that the meaning of “criminal prosecution” is not confined to those misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is actually or even potentially to be imposed
- describing a $1,000 fine as “at the margin of legislative discretion” dividing a civil from a criminal penalty, and as “strong evidence of the punitive significance” that the legislature intended the fine to have
- observing that “all criminal 47 prosecutions” in Oregon Constitution includes all conduct that the legislature has defined as a criminal offense
- holding that Oregon constitution does so extend jury trial right

## Opinion text

TONGUE, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not in all of the reasoning adopted by the majority in reaching that result.
Among other things, I do not agree with the majority in its primary reliance upon Article I, § 11 of the Oregon Constitution. In my opinion, the same result is required by Amendments VI and XIV to the Constitution of the United States and is not foreclosed by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, as I read those decisions.
I am also not willing to concede, as the majority would apparently hold, that the legislature may "decriminalize” any offense, no matter how serious, provided only that it does so properly and completely, after consideration of all of the various "factors” involved, and that the seriousness of the offense is only "one factor” to be considered and can never be "conclusive.”
In particular, I am not willing to concede that the legislature may "decriminalize” the "first offense” only of any serious crime and leave for criminal prosecution as a crime any and all further offenses of the same nature by the same person. According to the majority, that question cannot properly be raised in this case and can only be properly raised upon a criminal prosecution for a second or further offense. I am not willing to concede that this is correct, except to the extent that any contention based upon an "enhanced penalty” for a second offense can obviously not be raised on trial for a first offense.
*112 It appears from the legislative history of the 1975 Oregon Motor Vehicle Code that the legislature considered driving under the influence of intoxicants to be a serious offense because of the potential danger of death or serious injury to pedestrians, to other motorists and to their passengers, and that the primary reason for "decriminalizing” first offense for DUIL was that:
"Procedurally, the traditional criminal treatment of traffic offenses has put severe stress upon Oregon’s minor court system. Frequently the heavy caseloads, particularly in district court * * * have caused lengthy delays in bringing to trial the more serious cases such as those for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUIL). Whereas a person charged with a felony in this state in most cases is tried within 60 days of arrest, it is not unusual to find periods of six months or longer between arrest and trial in DUIL cases. * * *”
Surely this does not mean that in the event of congestion in the courts as the result of a heavy load of criminal prosecutions for serious crimes such as burglary, robbery, or assault with a dangerous weapon, the legislature may take away the constitutional right to trial by jury, the right to court appointed counsel and the right to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for all first offenses simply by "redefining” all first offenses as "infractions,” leaving for criminal prosecution all further offenses of the same nature by the same person.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9552450. Public record. Not legal advice.