# People v. Disbrow

> California Supreme Court · February 6, 1976 · 16 Cal. 3d 101

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551945

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT MARSHALL DISBROW, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 6, 1976
- **Citations:** 16 Cal. 3d 101; 127 Cal. Rptr. 360; 545 P.2d 272; 1976 Cal. LEXIS 210
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wright
- **Judges:** Mosk, Wright, Richardson
- **Cited by:** 140 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by People v. Samuel, 29 Cal. 3d 489 (1981).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551945

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that "something more than personal disagreement by a majority of members of a state court with the decision of the United States high tribunal on search and seizure is required if the persuasion of that court is not to be followed." Further observing that "the shifting …

## Opinion text

WRIGHT, C. J.
I concur. As I joined the majority in People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], which was filed on July 31, 1974, and I now join the majority in overruling that opinion, I believe a brief explanation of my change in position on the principal issue raised in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ] is warranted. When I signed Nudd I was motivated primarily by my abhorrence of the possibility of perjured testimony although as a long-time trial judge I well recognized that defendants in criminal actions were prone to commit a “little” perjury when their life or liberty was at stake. I, of course, did not condone such conduct. Further, I could not at that time conceive that evidence obtained in incidents such as the present flagrant violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] and People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ] would ever be presented to a trier of fact. Miranda articulates a sound and workable exclusionary rule which is still the law of this land. I now recognize that rule is eviscerated when police officers can ignore the duty to give the warnings or, as in the instant case, violate Miranda and Fioritto requirements knowing full well that the illegally obtained statements may be admissible for impeachment purposes if a defendant elects to testify.
Moreover, as the majority opinion so convincingly sets forth, adherence to Harris and Nudd will force revival of numerous, elusive tests of voluntariness to determine if statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible or inadmissible for purposes of impeachment. A host of appellate opinions on this imprecise test would soon be spawned. Miranda eliminated the need for such inquiries and I believe that salutary effect should not be thwarted.
Finally, I find that fundamental fairness to individuals accused of the commission of a public offense demands that Harris-Nudd be rejected. Regardless of the precision of instructions limiting the trier of fact to consideration of the illegally obtained statements solely for impeachment purposes, it is simply unrealistic to believé that such statements will not *117 be considered by the trier of fact as substantive evidence of guilt. I now recognize that this manifestly prejudicial and unfair use of the illegally obtained evidence would transform Miranda into a rule of form rather than one of substance. Such a transformation should not occur in California.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551945. Public record. Not legal advice.