# State v. Wood

> Utah Supreme Court · May 13, 1982 · 648 P.2d 71

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551661

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter J. WOOD, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** Utah Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 13, 1982
- **Citations:** 648 P.2d 71; 1982 Utah LEXIS 961
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hall
- **Judges:** Stewart, Hall, Oaks, Durham, Crockett, Howe
- **Cited by:** 129 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Limited by State v. Eloge, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (1988).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551661

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that "'the sentencing authority ... must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation ... [and] that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that an attorney "acts' as an assistant for his client, and not as a master" (citations omitted)
- stating that no specific weight is to be assigned to individual aggravating and mitigating factors and that all cireumstances must be weighed when considering the appropriateness of the penalty
- noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense, and that the defendant must "show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have…
- holding that sentencing authority must decide how “compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors are when compared against the totality of the aggravating factors”

## Opinion text

HALL, Chief Justice
(concurring in the result):
I concur in affirming the defendant’s conviction.
In regard to the issues raised on appeal pertaining to the sentencing phase of the trial, I view as dispositive the fact that the trial judge erred in refusing to apply the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in determining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant. I therefore concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court which remands this case to the trial judge for the purpose of resentencing in accordance with the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 76-3-207(3).
HOWE, J., does not participate herein.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9551661. Public record. Not legal advice.