# Robertson v. City of Jones

> Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma · December 24, 1991 · 63 O.B.A.J. 2164

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550770

## Case

- **Full name:** Patsy Gene ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. the CITY OF JONES, Oklahoma, Appellee, and the City of Oklahoma City, the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Oklahoma, the Estate of Dr. Moorman Prosser, and Mr. Dwayne Fesler, Defendants
- **Court:** Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
- **Decided:** December 24, 1991
- **Citations:** 63 O.B.A.J. 2164; 832 P.2d 432; 1991 OK CIV APP 133; 1991 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 138; 1991 WL 346402
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brightmire
- **Judges:** Means, Rapp, Brightmire
- **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550770

## Opinion text

BRIGHTMIRE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority concludes that the “dispositive” factor is that the “City did not recognize the corner to be a special defect.”
Since this is a review of a summary judgment, it is necessary to determine whether there are any material facts in dispute which can support a tort claim against the defendant city. In my opinion there are. The issue is whether, as a mixed matter of law and fact, the city had a duty to post a warning sign in advance of a sharp ninety-degree turn of a rural highway. The legal aspect of the issue involves a determination of whether the complained-of condition constitutes a hazard “normally connected with the use of roadways” — of which the city has no duty to initially warn — or whether it was a “special defect” imposing on the city a duty to warn. See 51 O.S.Supp.1990 § 155(15).
In my opinion, a sharp unmarked ninety-degree curve of an improved highway in an unlit fifty-five-mile-an-hour zone is not a hazard “normally connected with the use of roadways” and certainly not one a motorist would normally expect to encounter without warning. The question therefore becomes this: Whether such a condition constitutes a “special defect” within the meaning of § 155(15). The examples of unexpected special defects included in § 155(15) are “excavations or roadway obstructions.” Another example is, of course, designing and building a rural highway which suddenly makes a sharp ninety-degree turn without any warning whatsoever. Such a condition is a prime example of a serious and dangerous “special defect.”
Whether the condition complained of is a “special defect” is a matter of first impression in this state. Determination of the issue depends upon whether reasonable men viewing the material filed by the plaintiff in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, would differ as to whether the complained-of condition constitutes a special defect. While I believe it very likely they would not differ, it is conceivable they could and therefore the matter is one for jury resolution.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550770. Public record. Not legal advice.