# State v. Bock

> Idaho Supreme Court · July 30, 1958 · 80 Idaho 296

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550513

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vondell A. BOCK, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Idaho Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 30, 1958
- **Citations:** 80 Idaho 296; 328 P.2d 1065; 1958 Ida. LEXIS 215
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Keeton
- **Judges:** Keeton, Porter, Smith, McQuade
- **Cited by:** 69 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated by State v. Dennis John Halseth, 157 Idaho 643 (2014).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550513

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, in dicta, that when one neither specifically refuses nor consents, he will not be deemed to have refused

## Opinion text

KEETON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the conclusion that the judgment of conviction should be reversed. I am not in agreement with the holding that certain evidence received was properly admitted. Nor do I think that defendant can be now tried under the negligent homicide statute, Sec. 49-1101, I.C. This statute by its terms does not include the offense of manslaughter when the death of another is caused by one driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If defendant were so driving, and death resulted to another by reason of such drunken driving, defendant is guilty of manslaughter. He violated a positive statute forbidding him so to drive, which violation is not covered by the negligent homicide statute.
“Where one commits an act expressly forbidden by law and thereby causes the death of another, such person may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter.” State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202 , 239 P.2d 258, 263 .
The crimes of manslaughter and negligent homicide are criminal offenses defined by separate statutes. The violation of one does not include the violation of the other. *312 Further, the accused was never given a preliminary examination or held to answer for the crime of negligent homicide.
Under Sec. 49-352, I.C., a person suspected by a police officer of driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, placed under arrest, and requested to submit to a chemical test, may refuse so to do and the statute expressly provides that under such circumstances, the test shall not be given.
The majority opinion holds that such refusal to submit to a chemical test may be received in evidence against the accused. I consider this ruling clearly erroneous. No person suspected of a crime can be required to furnish evidence on which to base a charge against himself, or to further his prosecution. Nor is he required to cooperate with prosecuting officials.
The receiving in evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood test is, in my opinion, reversible error. Objection to such evidence should be sustained. One cannot be convicted of a crime for claiming a right open to all persons.
Regardless of the statute, I do not think that any doctor, technician, police officer, or any other person has the right to stick sharp instruments into the body of any accused, against his will, to secure evidence, and any person so doing without the voluntary consent of the accused is, in my opinion, guilty of battery.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9550513. Public record. Not legal advice.