# Eckles v. State of Oregon > Oregon Supreme Court · August 4, 1988 · 306 Or. 380 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548698 ## Case - **Full name:** FRANK R. ECKLES, Dba Riverview Marina, Petitioner on Review, v. STATE OF OREGON Et Al, Respondents on Review - **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court - **Decided:** August 4, 1988 - **Citations:** 306 Or. 380; 760 P.2d 846 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gillette - **Judges:** Lent, Peterson, Gillette, Linde - **Cited by:** 96 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548698 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that an act that purports to abrogate the state’s contractual obligation violates the Oregon constitution’s provision based on the contract clause of the United States constitution, article I, § 10, while an act that only requires actions that violate the contract is a… - explaining that the United States Supreme Court distinguishes between the impairment of a contract, which may occur whenever a law enlarges, abridges, or changes the agreement, and the impairment of the obligation of a contract - explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim - noting that, in prior cases, the court had held that justiciable interests included a present or foreseeable financial impact, an interference with the rights of voters, and an adverse impact on the users of a road ## Opinion text GILLETTE, J., concurring in part and specially concurring in part. I join fully in the court’s opinion as to the unconstitutionality of section 4 of the Act and the breach of contract created by section 2.1 write separately only with respect to the question of remedy. It is regrettable that the entire collection of issues raised by this litigation, including the appropriate remedies for the participating insured and SAIF, could not be resolved in this one case. Had the matter come to us in some form in *411 which SAIF had been made a party 1 perhaps they could have been. In that way, SAIF would have been a party and the obvious remedy — repayment of the $81 million to SAIF — might have been ordered. In the wake of our decision today, such a case very well may be brought now. For myself, I do not assume as readily as does the majority that consideration of this or a similar kind of remedy is foreclosed in this case. Rather than simply declare that the individual employer has not made out his individual damage case, as the majority does, I should have preferred that we ask the parties for supplemental briefing on the question of remedy. If insurmountable procedural difficulties prohibit us from resolving the entire controversy, it would be time enough to say so after full briefing on the issue. I also agree with much of what is said in the separate opinion of Peterson, C. J. However, I cannot join in that opinion for these reasons: 1. I am more troubled than is the separate opinion by the absence of SAIF as a party. 2. I believe that the analogy to a mutual insurance company suggested by the separate opinion, while attractive, is not necessarily as complete as that opinion would have it. For example, I would not foreclose the possibility that SAIF, once its funds are restored, legally could choose to lower future rates instead of rebating portions of past premiums. 3. I do not know the extent to which, after today’s decision, the state yet may assert that section 1(1) of the separate Tax Act, the “franchise tax” provision, Or Laws 1982 (Special Session 3), ch 3, is valid. In light of footnote 3 of the majority opinion, 306 Or at 383, such an argument (if made) may turn out to be a slender reed. But neither the majority nor the separate opinion has answered the question of the validity of section 1(1) and, without an answer, directing repayment to SAIF is premature. *412 Linde, J., joins in this concurring and specially concurring opinion. ORCP 29A provides, in pertinent part: “A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in that person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those who are already parties * * *. If a person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, such person shall be made a defendant, the reason being stated in the complaint.” --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548698. Public record. Not legal advice.