# Brown v. Fritz > Idaho Supreme Court · May 2, 1985 · 108 Idaho 357 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548187 ## Case - **Full name:** Arlene F. BROWN, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. George T. FRITZ and Phyllis M. Fritz, Husband and Wife, Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents, and Daniel Manning, Does I Through V, Inclusive, and All Other Persons Unknown and Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Lien or Interest in the Real Property Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiff’s Ownership, or Which Constitute Any Cloud of Plaintiffs Title Thereto, Defendants - **Court:** Idaho Supreme Court - **Decided:** May 2, 1985 - **Citations:** 108 Idaho 357; 699 P.2d 1371; 1985 Ida. LEXIS 473 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Bistline - **Judges:** Shepard, Bakes, Donaldson, Bistline, Huntley - **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548187 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - discussing several infliction of emotional distress cases and noting that the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the actions of the defendant cause some physical injury to the plaintiff ## Opinion text BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring. Just as he did in Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897 , 665 P.2d 661 (1983), Justice Shepard again takes the Court in the right direction. The rule announced today brings to mind Linscott v. Rainier National Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854 , 606 P.2d 958 (1980), where one of Idaho’s outstanding trial judges, in an action brought against an insurance company, while declining to recognize a claim for inflicted emotional distress and anguish, held guilty of totally unjustified bad faith refusal of medical insurance claims and awarded $20,000 in punitive damages in addition to I.C. § 41-1839 statutory attorney’s fees of $1,800. My review of the record in Linscott fully convinces me that any court other than the one which heard the appeal would have affirmed the district court out' of hand. 1 The rule announced today fits well with Judge Cogswell’s decision in Linscott . Some policy holders placed in the same position as the Linscotts might have reacted only in anger or frustration, but others might have suffered even more severe emotional distress at be *364 ing so treated. 2 In this ease, the evidence is overwhelming that Mrs. Brown was indeed afflicted. But the question arises as to whether one person’s propensity to become so afflicted in stress situations should give rise to damages that others would not sustain. The punitive damages award in Linscott , while to my mind a very modest amount, was in part a proper substitute for those damages caused by emotional distress inflicted by Rainier. Hence, the trial bar may see our opinion today as perhaps both taking away and giving. To me it seems workable and should be tried. Applying what would amount to the rule of today’s case, Judge Cogswell, in denying damages for emotional distress caused by Rainier’s outrageous conduct, did not let such conduct go unrewarded, but undoubtedly had it well in mind when he assessed punitive damages. The Linscott Court, however, interfered. When the smoke cleared away all that remained of $20,000 punitive damages and $1,800 of attorney’s fees was the $1,800 which the Linscotts were entitled to with or without punitive damages — which magnificent amount would have as much deterrent effect on such a defendant as would a single flea on an elephant hide. While the appeal languished in the Supreme Court, Rainier became bankrupt and the Linscotts received nothing. The one bright line in Linscott is buried in footnote 6, “of course, it might be shown that in denying the claim the company committed some independently tortious act, which would give rise in itself to an award of punitive damages____” 3 Judge Cogs-well, in his Linscott decision stated: It is the finding of this Court that defendant acted in a conscious and willful disregard of plaintiffs’ rights and that their action was gross and outrageous justifying the Court in awarding punitive damages. The evidence is without conflict that: ' 1. The defendant sold the policies of insurance to Laurelie Linscott for a valuable consideration. 2. Laurelie Linscott made no misrepresentations in the policy application concerning her health. 3. The policy was represented to the plaintiffs and to Laurelie by the defendant’s agent as a policy covering all preexisting conditions six months after issuance. 4. After the claims were filed by the plaintiffs, the defendant refused pay *365 ment alleging misrepresentation by Laurelie Linscott. The refusal continued even in face of all of the medical advice in this case that Laurelie Linscott was not suffering from epilepsy per se, and that she had accurately reflected her health condition in the insurance application. 5. There is a complete lack of evidence in the case that would in any manner justify the defendant’s position of non-payment of these claims. 6. The only conclusion that the Court can make in view of the complete void in the evidence supporting defendant’s position is that the defendant’s conduct was a conscious, willful and deliberate disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights under the insurance contract and was oppressive and grossly outrageous. R., pp. 44-45. As any reader of Linscott will observe, the appellate court assessment of Rainier’s conduct was that, although outrageous, it merited no punitive damages. Under Cheney and today’s opinion the miscarriage of justice in Linscott will not again occur. Justice Bakes in dissent sees the Court as deciding an issue not before it. In particular he is perplexed that in doing substantial justice the Court is giving Mrs. Brown another shot at punitive damages. This is said to be wrong where she did not appeal from the trial court’s refusal to let her case go to the jury on that issue. Justice Bakes may be right, and the Court may stand guilty as charged. But it is not a novel proposition. In State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581 , 570 P.2d 259 (1976), Justice Bakes in his 1976 opinion held “that the complaint in the case was defective because it did not charge and describe an offense, and that prosecution under the complaint was a violation of Lopez’ due process rights under art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.” Id., at 582, 570 P.2d 259 . Of this Justice Shepard wrote his disagreement therewith: “Specifically, I disagree with its reliance upon the defectiveness of the complaint. This issue was neither considered by the trial court nor directly addressed in the briefs on argument provided on appeal.” Id,., at 585, 570 P.2d 259 . Nonetheless, on rehearing Justice Bakes continued to vote to overturn the conviction on those grounds first stated, this time without the concurrence of Justice Donaldson. Id., at 590 , 570 P.2d 259 . Justice Bakes was equally vocal in opposition to the Court’s restoration of punitive damages in Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., supra, in dissent he complained that the Court “gratuitously, and by obiter dictum, throws out the rules relating to punitive damages which were established in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683 , 496 P.2d 682 (1982) ... ”, explaining, “I say gratuitously because the rule announced by the Court today ... was not raised by either party in their issues on appeal...” Id., 104 Idaho at 931 , 665 P.2d 661 . In his assertion, Justice Bakes was eminently correct, but a large oversight was that when Justice McFadden authored Cox v. Stolworthy, Justice Bakes was also authoring Jolley v. Puregro, 94 Idaho 702 , 496 P.2d 939 (1972). The opinions in the two cases were released within seven days of each other. In neither of those cases had the parties raised the issue of, or requested, the restriction on punitive damages with which the Court came down — to the detriment of the science of civil jurisprudence for a full decade. See also Cheney v. Palos Verdes, supra, 104 Idaho at 907 , 665 P.2d 661 , Bistline, J., special concurring. . Justice McFadden, the author of Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683 , 496 P.2d 682 (1972), and proponent of its rule of three categories of "proper” cases for awarding punitive damages, and four district judges bear the responsibility for the Linscott decision. One would like to think that had five district judges sat on the appeal Judge Cogswell’s judgment would have stood intact. . Judge Cogswell stated his views on the law and pertinent facts: Plaintiffs were present with Laurelie Linscott when the policies were purchased from the defendant through Donald Squires. Norman Linscott helped Laurelie Linscott prepare the medical insurance claims for his daughter and helped to forward them to the defendant. His testimony is uncontradicted that the conduct of the defendant in denying the claims under the policy was extremely upsetting to the plaintiffs. The evidence is also uncontroverted that the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries under the policy, have not incurred any personal injury nor have they suffered damages for loss of a property right. It is important to note that the plaintiffs’ claim for mental suffering is based upon the ground of failure of the defendant to pay the policy claim and is not based upon the independent tort of outrageous conduct intentionally causing severe emotional distress. Idaho is committed to the doctrine that there is no common-law right of recovery for purely emotional trauma. Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery for emotional trauma where there were physical manifestations of the injury (See Summers vs. Western Idaho Potato Processing Company, 94 Ida I.) R„ p. 47. . This was exactly what was shown to the Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons, 100 Idaho 840 , 606 P.2d 944 (1980), district court and jury — the verdicts and judgment of which received the same treatment at the hands of the same court. After Max Rouse sold Hatfield’s tractor for half of the reserve price, it held the proceeds as ransom until Hatfield would agree to forego his claim for damages. When that failed and suit was filed by David Hatfield, Max Rouse, although a fiduciary, continued to withhold the $12,000 from Hatfield, and only paid it after verdict and judgment. The Linscott-Hatfield Court excused such conduct completely by eradicating the jury’s award of punitive damages— which the trial court had held was just and proper. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548187. Public record. Not legal advice.