# Beauchamp v. Oklahoma City

> Supreme Court of Oklahoma · October 16, 1970 · 477 P.2d 51

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548022

## Case

- **Full name:** Barbara J. BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA CITY, a Municipal Corporation, James H. Norick, Mayor of the City of Oklahoma City, Patience Latting, John M. Smith, George N. Sturm, Nelson E. Keller, Bill H. Bishop, Ben Franklin, A. L. Dowell and Rowe Cook, Members of the City Council, Defendants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Oklahoma
- **Decided:** October 16, 1970
- **Citations:** 477 P.2d 51; 1970 OK 192
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Davison
- **Judges:** Irwin, Blackbird, Jackson, Lavender, Davison, Williams, Hodges, McInerney
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548022

## Opinion text

DAVISON, Justice
(concurring specially)-
In concurring specially I desire to express my views for denying plaintiff’s prayer for the injunction.
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 , 90 S.Ct. 1990 , 26 L.Ed.2d 523 , the question presented was: Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to real property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve thé issuance of general obligation bonds? The court, with three Justices dissenting and one Justice abstaining, extended the principles in the Kramer and Cipriano cases and held that the Arizona Constitution and statutes, as applied to exclude non-owners of real property from voting in elections to approve issuance of general obligation bonds, violated the Federal Constitution. In making the determination the majority of the court concluded that “The differences between the interests of real property owners and the interests of non property owners are not sufficiently substantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise.”
I believe and conclude that there are significant and controlling facts that distinguish the situation in the instant case from that in the Phoenix case. In the present case the constitutional provision (Art. 10, § 27) permits personal property taxpayers and real property taxpayers to vote. A tax is required to be levied upon their personal and real property to pay the bonds. In Arizona voting was restricted to real property taxpayers. In the present case § 27 permits the property taxpaying voters to incur indebtedness and encumber their property without limit. In Phoenix the question as to whether or not a state could constitutionally confer upon all of its electors exclusive and absolute power to incur general bonded indebtedness without limit at the expense of personal and real property owners was not presented or considered. The importance and significance of this distinguishing feature of our Constitution was fully presented and discussed in Settle v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 462 P.2d 642 .
It is my opinion that the Phoenix decision is not controlling in the present situation.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice WILLIAMS concurs in the above views.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9548022. Public record. Not legal advice.