# Vachon v. Pugliese > Alaska Supreme Court · November 8, 1996 · 931 P.2d 371 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9546349 ## Case - **Full name:** Linda VACHON, Appellant, v. Robert PUGLIESE, Appellee - **Court:** Alaska Supreme Court - **Decided:** November 8, 1996 - **Citations:** 931 P.2d 371; 1996 Alas. LEXIS 130; 1996 WL 651324 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Compton - **Judges:** Compton, Rabinowitz, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe - **Cited by:** 66 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9546349 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that although the superior court clearly erred in finding certain statements of the wife to be false, there was enough other evidence bearing on her credibility that it was "highly improbable" that the superior court would have assessed her credibility more favorably b… - holding that "absent extraordinary circumstances, courts should apply the calculation methodology of Rule 90.3 to determine amounts to be reimbursed to custodial parents for support of children during periods not covered by support orders" - holding that reimbursement of child support for a period during which there was no existing child support order does not violate Rule 90.3(h)(2) because the reimbursement does not modify any existing arrears - explaining that modification of a child custody order would be improper if based on speculation of future noncompliance "when other, less severe, remedies are available" - reversing custody order where stability and continuity factor “clearly favored” mother but trial court awarded a father sole physical custody based on erroneous finding that mother would interfere with his relationship with child ## Opinion text COMPTON, Chief Justice, dissenting. I dissented from the August 6, 1996 Order reversing the custody award and remanding the case with instructions that an order awarding custody to Ms. Vachon be entered. I expressed the following view: I would affirm the judgment of the superi- or court. The court considered all relevant statutory criteria in determining custody, including: (1) Ms. Vachoris stated reasons for her unannounced departure from Alaska with the couple’s child, which it found pretextual and not credible; (2) the stability of the child’s environment— gained at the expense of Ms. Vachon’s pretextual departure from Alaska, relocation in Massachusetts, and resulting denial of Mr. Pugliese’s regular visitation and contact with the child in Fairbanks, where she had lived since birth—balanced against the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent, which it found utterly lacking in Ms. Vachon; and (3) the importance of enforcing statutory policies against parental kidnapping, forum shopping, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. It concluded that “the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent,” AS 25.24.150(c)(6), was the “key determinative factor” in awarding custody to Mr. Pugliese. If the superior court applied an incorrect legal standard, a proposition with which I would not agree, the remedy should be to remand the case to that court with directions that it apply the correct legal standard. If the superior court [arguably] abused its discretion, the standard which I believe should be applied [to this case], I find Ms. Vachon’s argument devoid of merit. I have reviewed the court’s “written discussion of its reasons for granting the relief’ requested by Ms. Vachon. The reasons are not now more persuasive than before they were reduced to writing. The message conveyed by this case is both clear and disturbing: if the self-appointed child custodian can remove the child from the state and keep the child away long enough, even if the self-appointed custodian must return for an eventual trial on the custody issue, the statutorily articulated preference for having custody decisions made in the “home state” loses any value. Highlighting this point is the fact that the court has embarked upon a judicial prioritization of the statutory criteria found in AS 25.24.150(c), a policy it has never before endorsed. The court holds that if there is a conflict between §§ 150(c)(5) and (6), “a change in custody should not be ordered until the court has explored less intrusive means of obtaining compliance unless it finds such means would be futile_ [W]e conclude, as a matter of law, that the continuity and stability factor controls the result of this case.” Maj. Op. at 380, 381. The mischief *383 this prioritization 13011 lead to cannot be minimized. It should not be ignored. It was only after Ms. Vachon lost on the jurisdictional issue that she began to comply with Alaska court orders. By that time she had kept the child away from the “home state” for at least six months. She had reestablished family relationships, and had begun creating a new “stable environment” for the child. By the time of trial it becomes of little consequence where the trial is held. The policies which the superior court concluded were important, i.e. policies regarding parental kidnapping, forum shopping, and principles relating to uniform child custody jurisdiction, apparently are not worthy of judicial enforcement. Even though the court ably distinguishes this case from the criminal proceeding at issue in Strother v. State, 891 P.2d 214 (Alaska App.1995), the policies underlying all are the same. The superior court’s findings regarding Ms. Vachon’s violation of those policies are not clearly erroneous, apparently only irrelevant. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9546349. Public record. Not legal advice.